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CHAPTER I 
SOME .ASPECTS OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE 
The Role of Capital or Durable Goods 
in the Business Cycle 
Many speeches have been delivered, many books 
have been written, and many arguments and controversies 
have arisen in dealing with and the describing of the 
nature, causes, and theories of the business cycle. 
Economists differ as to the efficacy of com-
pensatory or corrective measures which could or have been 
applied by political systems to correct maladjustments 
which periodically appear on the business horizon. 
There is no unanimity of opinion in business 
cycle theory as to the causes of the business cycle. (In 
fact, the classical joke of the English economists is 
that when five economists in London get together there 
are six opinions- two of them are Keynes'.) Theories as 
to the cause of the business cycle vary from such bizarre 
theories as the oorrela~ion of sun spots to business 
activity, and the correlation of conceptions, as calcu-
lated from the birth rate, with business fluctuations in 
such a way as to suggest that these strong emotional re-
actions are related to the errors of optimism and 
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pessimism which so definitely affect business activity; 
to very complicated theories which emphasize monetary 
aspects, non-monetary overinvestment, maladjustments in 
the exchange of goods, and psychological factors.(l) 
Although economists do not agree as to the cause 
of the breakdown in the economic structure which brings 
about the collapse, or as to the best methods to effect 
the revival once the breakdown has taken place, there is 
remarkable unanimity of opinion - and statistics justify 
this - that the durable or capital goods industry is the 
section of economic society which suffers most in the 
depression phase of the cycle, and the one which prospers 
most when prosperity is present. 
Table I presents a clear statistical picture as 
to the relative activity in the durable and non-durable 
goods industries from 1919 to the present time. This mate-
rial was presented in graphic form by Dr. Lubin before the 
Temporary National Economic Committee in Washington in 
1939. There are three periods of economic depression in 
this twenty-year period, namely, 1921-1922, 1932-1933, and 
1937-1938. The relative swings in activity between durable 
and non-durable goods industries can best be understood by 
(1) McNair, M. P., Business and Modern Societ , Chapter on 
"Business Cycle Theor Cambridge, 
1938), pp. 193-197 
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TABLE I { 1) 
FEDERAL RESERVE INDEX 
OF 
MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
(19.2_3-1925 average production total 
- 100) 
Total Index Non-durable Durable 
Jan . 82.2 41 . 4 40 . 8 
1919 April 78.9 42 . 8 )6 .1 
July 89 .2 48 . 0 41 . 2 
Oct. 86 . 5 49.9 )6 . 6 
Jan. 96.5 51.5 45 . 0 
19:20 April 88 . 9 48 . 8 40.1 
July 88.8 44. 7 44. 1 
Oct . 81.9 39.1 42 . 8 
Jan. 64.6 35 . 0 29 . 6 
1921 April 6).2 40 . 4 22 . 8 
July 65.2 44 . 0 21 •. 2 
Oct . 72 . 4 46.0 26 . 4 
Jan . 73.4 46 . 3 27. 1 
1922 April 81 . 7 45 . 4 36 . 2 
July 90.8 49.9 40.9 
Oct. 94 . 3 52 . 3 42.0 
Jan. 99 . 4 53 . 9 45 . 6 
1923 April 105 . 9 56 . 9 49 . 0 
July 103 . 1 52 . 9 50.0 
Oct. 98 . 2 51 . 9 46 . ; 
Jan. 99 . 2 5.2. 9 46 . 3 
1924 April 95 . 3 51 . 4 43 . 9 
July 82 . 2 . 48 .1 34. 1 
Oot. 94 . 9 53 . 6 41 . 6 
Jan. 105 . ) 56 . 1 49 . 2 
1925 April 102 . 7 55 . 8 46 . 9 
July 102 . 8 55 . 4 47 -4 
Oct . 106 . 4 55 . 7 50 . 8 
Tabl e I 
-4-( cont' d) 
Total I_ndex Non- durable Durable 
Jan . -109 . 0 57 . 2 51 . 8 
1926 April 106 . 2 55 . 9 50 . 2 
July 107 . 2 56 . 0 51 . 6 
Oct . 111. 1 59 . J 51 . 8 
Jan . 105 . 4 58.2 47 . 2 
1927 April 107. 9 59 . 6 48 . 2 
July 107. 1 60 . 5 46 . 6 
Oct . 102 . 0 58 . 6 43 . 4 
Jan . 107. 6 59 . 3 48 . 3 
1928 April 108 . 9 58. 0 50 . 9 
July 109 . 6 57. 7 51 . 9 
Oct . 115 . 4 61 . 0 54. 5 
Jan. 119 . 4 6J . J 56 . 1 
1929 Apt~il 121. 3 6) . 8 57. 4 
July 124. 9 62 . 9 62 . 0 
Oct . 118 •. 3 63 . 3 55 . 0 
Jan . 104. 8 58 . 6 46 . 2 
19JO April 104. 4 57. 0 47 -4 
July 91 . 9 52. 4 J9 . 5 
Oct . 86 . 2 53. 0 :33 . 2 
Jan. 82. 9 5l . J )1 . 6 
1931 April 87. 6 55 . 1 )2 .6 
July 8.2 . 0 55 -J 26 . 8 
Oct . 71 . ) 51 . 3 20 . 0 
Jan. 71 . 0 51 . 2 19 . 8 
1932 April 60.7 44 . 6 16 . 1 
July 59 •. 2 47 . 4 11 . 8 
Oct . 65. 6 51 . 2 14. 4 
Jan . 6.3.4 47 . 1 16 . 3 
1933 April 65 . 4 48 . 9 16 . 4 
July 101 . 9 64 . J 3? . 4 
Oct . 75 . 5 51 . 0 24. 6 
Jan . 76 . 4 51 . 7 24. 7 
1934 April 84 . 9 5J . 2 31 . 7 
July 74 .1 50 . 0 2J . 4 
Oct . 7.2.4 52.8 19 . 6 
Table I 
-5-(cont'd) 
Total Index Non-durable Durable 
Jan. 89.7 55.6 J4.1 
1935 April 86.3 53.6 32.7 
July 86.5 5J.8 32.7 
Oct. 95.3 56.9 38.4 
Jan. 96.1 57.1 39.0 
1936 April 99.7 56.0 43.7 
July 109 .. 4 60.1 49.3 
Oct. 110.1+ 60 .. 0 50 .. 4 
Jan. 114.9 62.9 52.0 
1937 April 118.3 64.0 54 .. 3 
July 114.4 58.1 56.4 
Oct. 100.6 5J.8 46.8 
Jan. 76.1 50.0 26.2 
1938 April 73.3 48.9 24.4 
July 81.6 54-5 .27.1 
Oct. 94 .. 8 56.2 38.6 
Jan. 102.0 55.0 47 .. 0 
1939 April 95.0 54.5 40.5 
July 100 .. 0 56.0 46.0 
Oct. 120.0 60.5 59 .. 5 
Jan. 122.0 62.0 60.0 
1940 April 102.0 53.0 49.0 
July 121.0 6.2. 5 58 .. 5 
Oct. 125 .. 0 61 .. 0 64 .. 0 
(1) Index from 1919 to July, 1939 taken from TNEC Reports, 
Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power, 
Part I, pp. 202-203; Index from July, 1939 through 
1940 estimated from charts appearing in Federal Reserve 
Bank Bulletins. 
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examining these periods. 
In the first period, J"anuary of 1920, the total 
index of manufactured products was 96.5 per cent, the 
non-durable index 51.5 per cent, and the durable 45.0 
per cent. In April of 1922, the approximate low point of 
the depression, the total index was 63.2 per cent, regis-
tering a decline of approximately 35 per cent, the non-
durable index was 40.4 per cent, representing a decline 
of about 22 per cent, while the durable index reached 22.8 
per cent, representing a decline of 50 per centt 
The same phenomenon occurred after the 1929 
debacle, only this time the relative decline in durable 
goods was more serious. From April, 19.29 to July, 19 32, 
the total index of manufactured products declined 53 per 
cent, while the non-durables group suffered a decline of 
some 25 per cent and the durable goods group dropped pre-
cipitously, or 81 per cent from its former level. 
Substantially the same thing happened in the 
Fall of 1937 as in the two previous recessions which I 
have examined except for one striking difference. Instead 
of the decline continuing for a period of two to three 
years, the recession phase of the cycle was completed in 
approximately six months. During this six months' period 
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. the total index dropped 26 per cent, but the non-durable 
index declined only 8 per cent, ~mile the durable goods 
index dropped some 49 per cent. 
Three of the most important products which con-
stitute the capital goods are lumber, steel, and cement. 
Vlliat were some of the changes in the production of these 
commodities in recent years? 
In Table II, are presented the statistics for 
lumber production in the United States from 1919 through 
1939. There was a decline of 18 per cent in lumber pro-
duction in 1921 as compared to 1920. This decline does 
not appear unusual in relation to production in general, 
but this resistance to decline can probably be accounted 
for by post-war building. When we examine the Great De-
pression, however, we find lumber production in 1932 had 
declined to 27 per cent of its 1929 level. In 19J8 we 
find lumber production at 84 per cent of that in 1937 . 
In connection with our discussion of lumber production , 
it should be kept in mind that a fundamental problem was 
entering the lumber industry during this period. Largely, 
the problem was due to the substitution of other products 
for lumber in construction, such as steel and its various 
alloys, and plastics. As Table II indicates, lumber 
1919 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
19.28 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
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TABLE II 
ANNUAL PRODUCTION OF LUMBER ( 1) 
IN UNITED STATES 
(Millions of Board Feet) 
34,503 
35,002 
29,001 
35,252 
41,000 
39,501 
41,000 
39,751, 
37,250 
)6,750 
36,886 
26,051 
16,523 
10,1.51 
13,961 
15,494 
19,539 
24, 355 
25,600 
21,648 
25,260 
(1) Statistics for 1919 to 1937 taken from TNEC Reports, 
Part I, p. 208; statistics for 1938 and 1939 from Sup-
plement to Survey of Current Business (1940}, p. 125 
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production in 1923 and 1925, commonly used as base years, 
was 41 billion board feet, whereas in 1929, when business 
was at its peak, lumber production was only 26.8 billion 
board feet. 
Pig iron production is usually accepted as a 
good criterion as tc a ctivit y in the steel industry. In 
Table III, are presented production statistics for pig 
iron from 1910 through 1939. It can readily be seen that 
pig iron production dropped 56 per cent in the depression 
year of 1921 as compared to 1920. In the Great Depression 
the percentage decline was even more severe, as production 
in 1932 was only 19 per cent of the 1929 total output. In 
1938 we find the decline in pig iron production was very 
severe. Production in 1938 was 51 per cent of that in 
1937. The decline of production in this industry was even 
more severe and precipitous than the percentages for the 
entire year indicate. These percentages are based upon 
the entire year, s.nd therefore, do not show changes which 
occurred within that year. The following monthly figures 
of output as a percentage of capacity for the steel in-
dustry reveal that in just a four months' period , 
September, 1937 to January, 1938, the severest shock ever 
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TABLE III 
PIG IRON PRODUCTION ( 1) 
IN UNI'I'ED SI' ATES 
(Gross Tons) 
1910 26,900,000 19.25 .36 , 500 , 000 
1911 23,400,000 1926 39,200 , 000 
1912 29,400 , 000 19'27 .36 , 400 , 000 
191.3 .20 1600 J 000 1928 38 , 000,000 
1914 2.3 , 100,000 1929 42,500 , 000 
1915 .29 J 600' 000 19.30 31 ,700 , 000 
1916 29 , 100,000 19.31 18 , 400 , 000 
1917 .38 , 200 , 000 1932 8 , 800 , 000 
1918 38 , 700 , 000 19.33 13, JOO , OOO 
1919 .30 ,700 , 000 19.34 16 , 100 , 000 
1920 36,600,000 19 .3 5 21 , .300 , 000 
1921 16 , 600 , 000 19.36 .31 , 000 , 000 
1922 27 , 000,000 19.37 .37 , 000 , 000 
19'23 40,100,000 19.38 18 , 780 , 000 
1924 31 , 200 , 000 1939 .31 , 536 , 000 
{1) Statistics for 1910 to 19.37 taken from TNEC Reports, 
Part I , p . 207; St atistics for 1938 and 19.39 taken 
from Supplement to Survey of Current Business (1940) , 
p . 1)0 
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received by the steel industry was recorded . 
Rate of Steel Operations 
Unit: Per Cent - Output vs . Capacity 
illl 1938 
January 81 . 4 29 . 2 
February 84.3 31 . 6 
March 89 . 9 33.7 
April 90 .2 33 . 3 
May . 88 . 8 30 . 3 
June 74-5 28 . 4 
July 78 . 5 33 . 3 
August 83 . 8 42 . 7 
September 76 . 5 . 46 .1 
October 58.3 52 . 3 
November 38 . 2 61 . 8 
December 25 . 4 52 . 8 
In Table IV, production statistics are given 
for Portland cement by years from 1910 through 1939 . Pro-
duction declined i n 19.21, as compared to 1920 , only 1 . 2 
per cent. The decline in produ ct i on of cement was even 
less during this depression than non-durable production, 
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TABLE IV 
PRODUCTION OF PORTLAND CEMENT (1) 
IN UNITED STATES 
(Barrels) 
1910 76 600 000 , , 1925 161 700 000 
J ' 
1911 78,500,000 1926 164,500,000 
1912 8'2 400 000 , ' 1927 173,200,000 
1913 92 100 000 
' ' 
19.28 176,300,000 
1914 88,200,000 19.29 170,600,000 
1915 85,900,000 19JO 161 ' .200' 000 
1916 91,500,000 1931 125,400,000 
1917 92,800,000 1932 76,700,000 
1918 71,100,000 1933 6J,500,000 
1919 80,800,0UO 1934 77,500,000 
1920 
-
100,000,000 1935 76,700,000 
1921 98,800,000 1936 112,700,000 
1922 
-
·114,800,000 1937 116 200 000 
' ' 
19'2.3 
-
137,500,000 1938 105,552,000 
1924 
-
149,4.00, 000 1939 121,824,000 
(1} Statistics for 1910 to 1937 taken from TNEC Reports, 
Part I, p. 206; Statistics for 1938 and 1939 taken 
from Supplement to Survey of Current Business (1940), 
p. 1.50 
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but this, as with the case of lumber, can be explained 
by residential construction which had been curtailed 
during the World War. During the Great Depression, how-
ever, cement production was curtailed in its low year, 
1933, by 63 per cent as compared to 1929, or production 
in 1933 was 37 per cent of its 1929 level. In 1938 that 
cement production declined to only 90 per cent of its 
1937 production. 
In the above discussion of pig iron and cement 
production, I have ignored the effects of public works, 
pump priming, etc. on these products, because the amount 
of cushioning which these government expenditures produce 
is debatable. We can assume, however, that the production 
of these commodities would have been even more volatile 
had it not been for government expenditures. 
The three products which are discussed above, 
namely, pig iron, lumber, and cement are typical durable 
or capital goods products. As a contrast to these products, 
in Table V, are presented production statistics for a typi-
cal consumer good, namely, shoes. In 1921 production of 
shoes declined to 90.8 per cent of its 1920 level. In 1932, 
the year in which shoe production was the lowest, production 
was still at 86.7 per cent of its 1929 level, and in 1938 
production declined only to 94 per cent of that in 1937. 
1919 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
19.24 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
'1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
19'39 
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TABLE V 
ANNUAL PRODUCTION OF SHOES ( 1) 
(Thousands of Pairs) 
331,225.000 
Jl5,000,000 
286,771,000 
323,877,000 
351,114,000 
313,229,000 
323,552,000 
324,513,000 
.343. 608 '000 
344,.352,000 
361,402,000 
J04,168,000 
316,239,000 
313,291,000 
350,380,000 
357,121,000 
38),761,000 
415,227.000 
411,969,000 
390,744,000 
424,140,000 
(1) Statistics for 1919 to 1937 taken from TNEC Reports, 
Part I, p •. 208; Statistics for 1938 and 19)9 from Sup-
plement to Survey of Current Business ( 1940), p. 1.24 
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In Table VI, the percentage declines for these 
four products are compared. An examination reveals that, 
\rlth the exception of cement in the 1921 depression, the 
production of the consumer good was much more resistant 
to depression forces than was the production of durable 
goods. 
1920 
1921 
1929 
* 1932 
TABLE VI 
Per eent decline in Production for Pig Iron, 
Cement, Lumber, and Shoes in Depre$sion Year 
Compared to Pre-depression Year 
(1920, 1929, 1937 • 100) 
Pig Iron Cement Lumber Shoes 
100% lOo% 100% 100% 
44 98.8 82 <10.8 
100 100 100 100 
19 37 27 86.7 
1937 100 100 100 100 
1938 51 90 84 94 
* The 1933 figure was used in the computation 
for cement, since this was the low year for 
this commodity. 
The above discussion and objective examples 
prove that durable goods industries, in general, are more 
vulnerable to depression shocks than are non-durable 
goods industries. Leonard P. Ayres, in his book, Chief 
Causes of This and Other Depressions, comes to this same 
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general conclusion and applies it to an explanation of 
unemployment. The following are his estimates of unem-
ployment during the last four depressions: "Durable 
goods unemployment amounted to 71 per cent of all 
unemployment in the major depression of 1921, to 63 per 
eent of it in the minor depression of 1924, to 94 per 
cent of it in the minor depressions of 1927 and 1928, and 
to almost 79 per cent of it in the great depression up to 
the end of 1934. If we combine the figures covering all 
four depressions, we find that the unemployment among 
makers of durable goods amounted to 77 per cent of all 
unemployment among producing workers."(l) 
(1) Ayres, L. P., Chief Causes of This and Other Depressions, 
(New York, l935), p.29 
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The Relationship or the Railroads 
to Recovery in the Durable Goods Industry 
In order to determine if there is a relation-
ship existing between railroad spending and recovery in 
the durable goods industry, it is necessary first to deter-
mine the amount and importance of this spending in the 
past. 
In 1929 John E. Partington made a study of rail-
road purchasing and its relationship to the business cycle. 
The study extended from 1870 through 1926. On the basis of 
his analysis he was able to draw several conclusions. 
Briefly these were as follows: 
1. In a majority of eases railroad baying reviv-
ed some months before commercial and industrial activity 
began to revive during periods of depression, and in pros-
perity periods railroad buying declined some months in 
advance of the general decline in business. The tendency 
for railroad purchasing to ant ·icipate the turns in activity 
was more marked in periods of depression than in those of 
prosperity. 
2. The tendency for railroad purchasing to antic-
ipate the turns in the cycle was more marked in the latter 
part of the period studied than in the forepart. 
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3. While railroads bought most freely when 
their earnings were the largest, changes in the volume 
of orders almost invariably preceded similar changes in 
gross earnings. 
4. The data did not enable him to explain any 
causal relationship between railroad spending and the 
business cycle. He stated that the tendency for railroad 
purchasing to precede general business activity could be 
explained by changes in the cost of equipment brought 
about by cyclical fluctuations in wages, interest, and 
other costs, or as an evidence of foresight of railroad 
managements, or finally, as evidence that the purchases 
of railroads are themselves a major factor in determining 
the ebb and flow of business.(l) 
It is my belief that the purchases of railroads 
before 1929 was a major factor in determining the level 
of general business activity. In Table VII are presented 
statistics concerning the purchases of rolling stock by 
Class I railroads from 1922 through 1939. It is apparent 
that total purchases between 1922 and 1930 averaged approx-
imately 360 millions of dollars per year, whereas since 
1930 the average expenditure per year for rolling stock 
(1) Partington, J. E., Railroad Purchasing and the Business 
Cycle (Washington, D. C. 1929), p. 17-
20 
1939 
1938 
1937 
1936 
1935 
1934 
1933 
19.32 
1931 
1930 
19.29 
1928 
1927 
1926 
1925 
1924 
1923 
192.2 
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'.rABLE VII 
PURCHASES OF ROLLING STOCK ( 1) 
BY CLASS I RAILROADS 
($000,000 omitted) 
Freight Passenger 
Train Cars Locomotives Train Cars 
#66 .8 $42 .8 $19 .7 
5.2. 8 39 .6 18.1 
212 . 9 59.7 41.5 
117.8 16.2 18.8 
30 .7 :29 .1 16.2 
64.2 11.9 12.4 
6.9 5.1 2.4 
12.1 17.1 4.8 
29.5 25.8 13.9 
181.0 88.5 44~8 
191.9 70.7 38.7 
116.5 51.5 41 •. 2 
136.5 77. 0 53.8 
185.8 108.3 58.1 
222.5 59.8 41.2 
318 .6 102 ~4 53.9 
409.7 .209.0 40.1 
176.7 41.4 18. 0 
Total 
$1J3.4 
115 .4 
322 .9 
159.1 
79.3 
9.2 . 0 
15 .5 
J6.4 
73.1 
328 . 3 
321.) . 
224 . 3 
288.7 
371.9 
338.1 
493.6 
681.7 
245 .5 
( 1) Data for 1939 to 1926 from Monthly Stock Digest 
(Dee. 1940), p. 5; Data for 1925 to 1922 from Bureau 
of Railway Economies 
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has been approximately 114 millions of dollars per year. 
In only one year since 1930 have the railroads expended 
as much for rolling stock as during the 1922-1930 period. 
That year was 1937, when purchases reached 323 millions. 
If we assume that purchases for 1940 are not greatly dif-
ferent from the 1931-1939 average, we find a differential 
in purchases for the past ten years of about 250 million 
dollars per year, or an accumulated difference of almost 
two and one-half billions for the ten-year period as 
compared to the 19.2:2-1930 average. 
Let us now compare this figure to the figure 
which other students of the railroad problem estimate to 
be the needs of America's rail-roads. In a study made of 
the recovery problem in the United States, the Brookings 
Institution presented the following statistics as to ac-
cumulated needs of the railroads. 
General Needs 
Railroad expenditures for capital and mainte-
nance purposes averaged about 2.5 billion dollars annually 
from 1925 to 1929. The average for the period rrom 1930 
through 1936 was only roughly one-half this amount. 
-21-
Way and Structures 
During the depression there was a drastic cur-
tailment of improvements in the form of heavier rails, 
additional ballasts, ~ew signal systems, grade reduc-
tions, straightening track, etc. Outlays for such pur-
poses in 1933 were less than 20 per cent of those in 
1929. Man-hours of road maintenance varied from 31 hours 
per 1,000 "car-miles run" in 1929 to 20 hours in 1933, 
and 21 in 1935. Tonnage of replacement rails laid de-
creased by 50 per cent from 1929 to 1934. Various 
authorities were cited as to the amount of deferred main-
tenance existing in 1936, estimates running from 200 
millions to 650 millions. The author assumed that the 
most conservative figure was 300 millions. 
Equipment 
At the end of 1936 there were about 12,000 
less locomotives than in 1929 - a decrease of about 21 
per cent. However, since this decrease has naturally 
taken place among the oldest, smallest, and least effi-
cient units, the loss in effective performance has been 
less than the decline in actual numbers would indicate. 
Average tractive power per unit, in fact, increased from 
44,801 to 48,36?. If one takes into account this increase 
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in average efficiency of the existing inventory, the 
greater tractive power of the newer types of locomotives, 
and also allowing for the excess stock in 1929, it would 
appear that something like 6,000 or 7,000 new locomotives 
would be necessary to give the tractive power equivalent 
to that of 19.29. To handle an increase of traffic pro-
portionate to the increase in population since 1929 would 
require about 2,000 additional engines. A deficiency of 
8,000 locomotives represents a cost of about 800 million 
dollars. This estimate assumes no increase in eompetive 
means of transportation. The importance of this factor 
is discussed later. 
The number of freight oars at the end of 1936 was 
approximately 500,000 (20 per cent) less than in 1929, 
while passenger cars showed a proportionate decline of 
l2,000. Allowing for a surplus of cars in 1929 and increas-
ed efficiency in the use of rolling stock, and also for a 
growth in traffic proportionate to the increase in popula-
tion, the deficiency would be some 400,000 freight cars 
and about 6,000 passenger cars. This accumulated deficien-
cy would represent a cost of approximately a billion 
dollars.(l) 
(1} In 1935 the average cost per unit of rolling stock con-
structed was: locomotives $103,450, passenger cars 
$31,145, and freight cars $2,133 (based on U.lilpublished 
data furnished by the Interstate· Commerce Commission). 
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By using these rough calculations in computing 
the accumulated needs and the deficiency existing in the 
railroad's way and structures and total rolling stock, 
we find that at the end of 1936 the total was approximate-
ly 2,200 million dollars.(l) 
In a study published in 1940 by the Brookings' 
Institute ' concerning capital expansion and economic sta-
bility, the follovdng conclusions were drawn concerning 
the railroad problem in the United States. "A very sub-
stantial part of the railway plant and equipment of the 
country is in need of replacement in the interest of 
decreasing costs. Great improvements have been made in 
the last decade in the tractive power of engines and in 
the capacity and serviceability of other rolling stock. 
There is, for example, a vast amount of obsolesence in 
box cars as a result of changes whieh have occurred in 
the kind of freight service demanded. The present box 
cars are not well suited for many commodities, and they 
do not offer protection against shocks when operated at 
the high speeds now required by shippers. The increase 
in the weight and speed of engines and trains results in 
greater wear and tear on roadbeds, necessitating greater 
( 1) Moulton, H. G., The Recover Problem in the United 
States Washington, D. c., 193 
p. '202 
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maintenance of way and structures. In addition, vast 
capital expenditures are still to be made in connection 
with the elimination of grade crossings, the reduction 
of curves and gradients, and the readjustment and reor-
ganization of terminal connections of facilities."(l) 
The number or freight cars in use decreased 
between 19'29 and 1939 by 596,841, and the total capacity 
declined by 22 per cent. By 19J9, 25 per cent of the 
freight cars were over 25 years old, another 20 per cent 
from .21 to .25 years old, and 17 per cent from 16 to 20 
years old. Only 9 per cent were under five years of age. 
Since the proper life for railway ears is regarded as 15 
to 20 years, it is evident that over one-half of the 
existing supply or freight cars were at the age of retire-
ment. ( 2) 
In the case of locomotives, the general view is 
that 30 years represents the maximum of efficient life, 
this time being used by the Interstate Commerce Commission 
in its depreciation charges. This does not mean that a 
locomotive with repeated repairs may not be used for a 
much longer period than 30 years; but it does mean that 
(1) Moulton, H. G., Capital Expansion, Employment and 
Economic Stability (Washington, D. c., 
1940), p. 180 
(2) Ibid., p. 173 
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the company could save money by replacing the locomotive 
even if the new engine were not a superior model; that is, 
the cost of keeping the old engine in repair exceeds the 
depreciation and maintenance charges of a new one.{l} 
From 19:29 to 19.39 the number of serviceable 
steam locomotives decreased by 25 per cent, and the trac-
tive power by about 17 per cent. Meanwhile, locomotives 
20 or more years old · increased from 36 to 69 per cent of 
the total. At the end of 1938 less than 5 per cent were 
"strictly modern," that is, under 10 years of age, as 
compared ~~th 20 per cent at the end of 1929. On December 
31, 19.38, 28.06 per cent of the serviceable locomotives 
were 29 or more years old, and another 23.82 per cent were 
from 24 to .28 years old. { 2) 
Although studies which have been made of the 
railroad problem in the United States do not agree on the 
quantitative aspect of the needs of the railroads, it is 
obvious that everyone who has studied the situation to 
any degree is unanimously of the Qpinion that railroads do 
need new equipment and greater expenditure on their way 
and structures to make them operate more efficiently at 
(1) Ibid., p. 172 
(2) Data for 1929 from Wall Street Journal (Nov. 25, 1930), 
p. 1; Data for 1938 from Interstate Commerce Commission, 
Statistics ~~Railways, pp. 5-15 
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decreasing costs and also from the point of view of 
national defense. 
Since this is the case, great amounts will 
have to be spent for these purposes. Are the railroads 
able to finance these expenditures? An attempt will be 
made to answer this question in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE TREND OF RAILWAY FINANCIAL CONDITION 
1890 - 19J8 
In order to obtain a clear statistical picture 
or the financial conditions of our railways, it is neces-
sary not only to study their present capitalization and 
income but also to examine the trend of this capitaliza-
tion and income over a period of years. An attempt will 
be made to analyze their capitalization and income in 
relation to other industries in order to see if the policies 
followed by the railway managements have been sound. For 
part of our data we shall go back as far as 1890, and for 
the remainder we shall go back only as far as seems neces-
sary or as availability of data dictates. 
The first ratio presented is the trend of the 
operating ratio. The operating ratio is derived by dividing 
operating expenses by operating revenues. This percentage 
is sometimes regarded as an indication of operating or man-
agerial efficiency, but this idea is hardly correct. A 
high ratio may be the result of external conditions over 
which the management has no control, such as business de-
pression or too low rates, etc. The operating ratie may 
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more properly be regarded as a rough indicator or the 
varying profitableness of the traffic and, as such, it 
is very important to the investor. There is no absolute 
standard for this ratio, but 70 per cent is regarded as 
"normal". Roads with a higher ratio usually are not 
earning a satisfactory return; when the ratio is lower, 
the situation is likely to be excellent.(!) 
In Table VIII are presented in tabulated form 
revenue derived from passenger and freight traffic, total 
operating revenue, total operating expenses, and the 
operating ratio for the years 1890-1938. This data covers 
Class I and II railroads for all years to 1929 and for all 
st earn railroads after 1929. 
It will be seen that for the years 1890 to 1908 
the ratio fluctuated in a narrow range from 65 to 67 per 
cent. From 1911 to 1920 the ratio showed a stead increase, 
except in 1916 when the extremely heavy traffic made pos-
sible a better showing, until the ratio reached an all-
time high in 1920 ot 94.4 per cent. This situation was 
due to the rapid rise in the general price level, the in-
ability of the roads to secure prompt rate readjustments, 
{1) Guthman, H. G., Analysis of Financial Statements, 
{New York, l935), pp. 308-309 
Year( .2) 
1890 
1891 
1892 
1893 
·1894 
1895 
1896 
1897 
1898 
1899 
1900 
1901 
1902 
190) 
1904 
1905 
1906 
1907 
1908 
1909 
1910 
1911 
1912 
1913 
1914 
1915 
1916 
1916 
1917 
1918 
1919 
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TABLE VIII 
RAILV{AY OPERATING RATIOS, 1890-19.)8( 1) 
(Dollar items are in millions) 
Freight Passenger Operating Operating 
Revenue Revenue Rev~nue( ]} Ex_penses 
• 714 • 261 • 1,05'2 $ 692 737 281 1,097 732 
799 .287 1,171 781 
829 302 1 ?·21 828 
··-. 699 .285 1,073 731 
730 252 1,075 726 
787 267 1,150 773 
773 251 1,122 752 
877 267 1,247 818 
914 291 1,314 857 
1,049 324 1,487 961 
1,118 351 1,588 1,030 
1,207 393 1, 7,26 1,116 
1,JJ8 422 1,901 1,258 
1,379 444 1,975 1,339 
1,451 473 2,082 1,391 
1,640 510 2,)26 1,537 
1,824 565 :2,589 1,748 
1;655 567 2,441 1,710 
1;678 564 2,473 1.650 
1,9.26 629 :2,812 1,882 
1;926 658 2,853 1,976 
1,969 660 2,906 2,035 
2,199 696 2,19.3 2,:2.36 
2,127 703 3,128 2,280 
2,0)8 646 2,956 2,089 
2,469 690 J,47J 2,277 
2,469 690 J,473 :2,277 
.2,897 841 4,115 :2,906 
3,522 1,046 4,985 4,072 
3,625 1,193 5,250 4,499 
Operating 
Ratio 
65.8 
66.7 
·66.7 
67.8 
68.1 
67.5 
67.2 
67.1 
67.6 
65.2 
64.6 
64.9 
64.7 
66.2 
67.8 
66.8 
66.1 
67.5 
70.1 
66.7 
66.9 
69.3 
70.0 
70.0 
72.9 
70.6 
65.6 
65.7 
70.6 
81.7 
85.7 
Year(2) 
1920 
1921 
1922 
19.23 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
. 1928 
19'29 
19JO 
1931 
1932 
193.3 
1934 
1935 
19J6 
19.37 
19)8 
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TABLE VIII (continued) 
RAILWAY OPERATING ~IOSL 1890-19.38(1) 
(Dollar ite.ms are in millions) 
Freight Passenger Operating Operating 
Revenue Revenue Revenue(?) Expense&. 
• 4,421 $ l~JO'j $ 6,310 $ 5,?54 
4,004 1;166 5,6JJ 4,669 
4,086 1,088 5,674 4,51@ 
4,712 1,159 6 '19 4,999 , ... 
4,437 1,086 6,045 4,609 
4,648 1,065 6,247 4,633 
4;906 1,049 6,509 4,766 
4,729 980 6,246 4,662 
4,772 905 6,21:2 4,509 
4;989 876 6,485 4,660 
4,145 7Jl 5;448 4,065 
3,302 552 4,317 3,330 
,2;485 .378 3,219 2,483 
. 2, ')28 JJO ,),195 2,325 
2,671 347 3,377 2,525 
.2,8Jl 358 :J, 566 2,678 
3,356 41J 4,197 J;OJl 
J,428 444 4,:321 J,2J1 
2,900 406 3,687 2,815 
Operating 
Ratio 
94.4 
82.9 
79.5 
77.9 
76.2 
74.2 
73.2 
74.6 
72.6 
71.86 
74.56 
77.10 
77.06 
72.82 
74.77 
75.17 
72.37 
74.89 
76.40 
( 1) tetta from the annual eytatistics of' Railways in the United 
States, Interstate Commerce Commission, (1922) p. LXXXVII; 
19)0, P• S.-118; 1939, p.S.-143 
(2) Data before 1916 for fiscal year ending June JO; af'ter 
1916 for calendar years. . 
(3) Before 1929, data for Class I and II railways; after 1929, 
for all steam railways. 
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the special costs of war-time administration, and in the 
following year, 1921, to the tremendous shrinkage of 
traffic.(l} From this point the ratio registered a 
steady decline up to 1930. The lowest point reached, 
however, was in 1929 when the ratio was at 71.8, which 
is several points higher than in the twenty-year period 
of 1890-1910. This point is of unusual significance be-
cause, as we see in retrospect, 1929 was the peak year 
of business activity for the last twenty years, and yet 
in that year the railroads as a whole, as shown by this 
ratio, were able to earn much less in · proportion to 
their equity than in any one of the twenty years from 
1890 to 1910. 
The ratio increased from 74.6 in 1930 to 77 per 
cent in 1932 and declined in 1933 to 72.8 per cent, but 
rose again in 1934 and 1935 to about a 75 per cent level. 
In 1936 the ratio declined to 72.4 per cent reflecting 
the increase in business activity, but again rose in 1937 
and 1938 to its former depression levels. 
Another index of the railways' operating finan-
cial condition is presented in Table IX. This index is 
the ratio ot operating expenses plus taxes and interest 
{1} Moulton, H. G., The American Transportation Problem (Washington, D. C., 1933), p. 2j 
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to operating revenue. This ratio is computed in the 
same manner as the operating ratio except that taxes and 
interest are added to the operating expenses. The result 
derived in this manner gives an indication as to the 
degree of success the railways have had in retaining 
something for the stockholders' equit·y. (1) 
The table also presents the absolute amount re-
maining after operating expenses, taxes and interest have 
been deducted from the operating revenue. These figures, 
together with the ratio obtained, indicate the amount in 
dollars and the proportion of the railways' revenues 
which were left for stockholders. This amount, in gen-
eral, can either be distributed to stockholders in the 
form of dividends or be reinvested in the business in the 
form of additions to property, ·property betterment, debt 
retirement, etc; in any case, a reinvestment of funds 
would result in an increase of surplus. 
Table IX reveals that the proportion and amount 
available for stockholders declined steadily from 1890 to 
( 1) As was originally pointed out by H. G. Moulton in The 
American Transportation Problem, pp. 27-JO, the ratio 
is not strictly a measure of the return received for 
conducting transporation since (a) no account is taken 
of non-operating income and non-~p.erating expense, and (b) the fixed charges include interest on obligations 
incurred for the purchase of securities which yield 
non-operating income. However, non-operating income and 
non-operating expense poth consist chiefly of payments 
between railways and are, therefore, not significant for 
the purpose of this table. 
TABLE IX 
OPERATING I INCOME COMPARED WITH EXPENSE( 1) 
(Dollar items are in millions) 
Ratio o~ 
Operating Expenses Operating 
Expense plus Taxes Revenue Less 
Interest plus '!'axes and Interest Expenses Plus 
Operating Operating ( 2) on Funded plus to Operating Taxes and 
Year Revenue E!:Eenses Taxes Debt Interest Revenue Interest 
1890 • 1,052 • 692 • )0 $ 222 $ 944 89.7 108 1891 1,097 732 32 220 984 89.7 11.3 
1892 1,171 781 33 240 . 1,0~4 90.0 117 
1893 1,221 828 35 250 1,113 91.2 108 
1894 1,073 731 37 253 1,021 95.1 72 
1895 1,075 726 38 252 1,016 94.5 59 
1896 1,150 773 38 250 1,061 92.2 89 
1897 1,122 752 41 248 1,041 92.8 81 
1898 1,247 818 42 246 1,106 88.7 141 
1899 1,)14 857 44 251 1,152 87.7 162 
1900 1,487 961 44 253 1,258 84.6 229 
1901 1,588 l,OJO 47 262 1, 339 84.) 249 
1902 1,726 1,116 50 274 1,441 83 • .5 285 
190.3 1,901 1,258 53 284 1, 595 8).5 306 
1904 1,975 1, 339 57 298 1,694 85.7 281 
1905 2,082 1,391 59 311 1,761 84.5 321 
1906 2,)26 1,537 69 323 1,929 82.9 397 
1907 2,589 1,749 74 344 2,167 8.3.7 422 
1908 2,441 1,710 79 )68 2,157 88.4 284 
1909 2,473 1,650 85 383 2,118 85.6 .355 
1910 2,812 1,882 98 400 2,.380 84.6 4.32 
1911 2,853 1,976 10.3 410 2,489 87 • .3 264 
1912 2,906 2,035 114 429 2, 578 88.7 328 
TABLE IX (continued) 
OPERATING INCOME COMPARED WITH EXPENSE( 1) 
(Dollar items are in millions) 
Ratio o:r 
Operating Expenses Operating 
Expense plus Taxes Revenue Less 
Interest plus Taxes and Interest Expenses Plus 
Operating Operating ( 2) on Funded plus to Operating Taxes and 
Year Revenue E!:eenses '!'axes Debt Interest Revenue Interest 
191) • 3,193 • 2,236 $122 • 435 $ 2, 793 87.5 400 1914 3,128 2,280 140 443 2,86) 91.6 265 
1915 2,956 2,089 138 464 2,691 91.0 265 
1916 3,4TJ 2,277 150 474 2,901 8).6 572 
1916 3,691 2,426 162 481 3,069 83.2 622 
1917 4,115 2,906 219 474 3,599 87.5 5-5-6 
1918 4,985 4,072 230 468 4,770 95.7 215 
1919 5,250 4,499 2.39 476 5,214 99.) 46 
1920 6,)10 5,954 289 500 6,743 106.9 433 loss 
1921 5,633 4,669 28) 529 5,481 97.) 152 
1922 5,674 4,510 308 539 5,357 94.4 .317 
1923 6,419 4,999 340 552 5,891 91.8 528 
1924 6",045 4,609 347 588 5,544 91~7 501 
192, 6,247 4,633 366 584 5,583 89.4 664 
1926 6,509 4,766 396 582 5,744 88.3 765 
1927 6,246 4,662 383 583 5,628 90.1 618 
1928 6,212 4, 509 .396 579 5,484 88.3 728 
1929( .3) 6,485 4,660 520 557 5,737 88.2 748 ( 4) 
Operating 
Year Revenue 
1930 • 5,448 
19)1 4,317 
1932 3,219 
1933 3,195 
1934 3,377 
1935 ),566 
1936 4,197 
1937 4,321 
1938 ;,687 
TABLE IX (continued) · 
OPERATING INCOME COMPARED WITH EXPENSE( 1) 
(Dollar items are in millions) 
Ratio of 
Operating Expenses 
Expense plus Taxes 
Interest plus Taxes and Interest 
Operating ( 2} on Funded plus to Operating 
ES!enses Taxes Debt Interest Revenue 
• 4,065 $472 • 569 . • 5,106 94.5 3,3)0 425 580 4,335 110.4 
2,483 383 579 3,445 107.0 
2,325 357 583 3,265 102.1 
2,525 351 567 3,443 101.9 
2,678 346 558 3,582 100.5 
3,031 445 550 4,026 97.4 
3,2)1 455 534 4,220 97.6 
2,815 465 524 3,804 103.5 
Operating 
Revenue Less 
Expenses Plus 
Taxes and 
Interest 
342 
18 lass 
226 loss 
70 loss 
66 loss 
16 loss 
171 
101 
117 loss 
(1) Data from the annual Statistics of Railways in -the United States, Interstate 
Commerce Commission (l922) p. LiXXvt; !930, p. S.-118; l939, p. S.-138 
(2) Taxes includes net equipment and joint facility rents from 1929 to 1938 
(J) Data before 1929 for Class I and II railways; after 1929 for all steam railways 
(4) Date before 1916 for years ending June 30; after 1916 for calendar years 
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1895. In the years 1896 and 1897 this trend reversed, 
and from those years until about 1906 and 1907 a steady 
increase was shown. Between 1907 and 1920 there was a 
steady decline, when in 1920 total expenses were 6.9% 
greater than revenues. This resulted in a net loss of 
433 millions to the railways. From 19,20 to 19:29 the 
ratio steadily improved so that in 1929 11.8 per cent of 
revenue was available for stockholders, or approximately 
748 million dollars. As far as net income is concerned, 
the 748 millions earnings in 19:29 was the second most 
prosperous year in the history of the railways, but as 
for percentage of revenue available for stockholders, 
there were fifteen years prior to 1929 in which the ratio 
was more favorable. This can be explained by the railway 
expansion and the increase in total investment, so that 
an increase in the absolute amount could even mean a de-
crease on a relative basis. 
Following 1929 the ratio increased until 1932. 
In that year expenses were 7 per cent greater than revenue, 
end a loss of 226 millions resulted. Profitable operations 
did not return again until 19)6 and 1937 when a net profit 
of 171 millions and 101 millions was recorded respectively. 
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Losses again resulted in 19)_8. in the amount of 117 
millions. In that year total expenses were '·' per cent 
greater than revenues. 
On the following page the operating ratio, to-
gether with the ratios of expenses plus taxes and inter-
est to operating revenues are plotted. The trend of the 
two ratios has been quite similar. However, the ratio 
of expenses plus taxes and interest to revenues improved 
in the 1920-1930 decade to about the level of the decade 
prior to 1900, while the operating ratio has failed since 
1920 to reach as favorable a level as was obtained in any 
year prior to 1914. 
H. G. Moulton explains this condition by the 
fact that the difference is due to a much larger portion 
of the investment being represented by bonded debt in the 
earlier years. He states that interest on funded debt in 
1890 amounted to :21.1 per cent of operating revenues, in 
1900 to 17.0 per cent, in 1910 to 14.2 per cent, in 1920 
to 7.9 per cent, and in 1929 to 9.1 per cent.(1) 
It is my belief that Mr. Moulton has made one 
{1} Moulton, H. ~., The ~~rican T~ansportation Problem (Washington, D. C., l9JJ),p. JO 
l'er 
c~'nt 
110 
100 
')J 
8J 
7J 
6J 
'j(J 
1890 
OPERATING RATIOS OF RAILWAYS 
-
1890 - 1938 
E~enses Plus Taxes a~ Interest 
to Operating Revdnues 
11Ju 1910 192U 
\ 
... 
•; 
" ,.._ "" ......... · ... 
19.30 i940 
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fundamental error. Although these percentage figures are 
accurate, his statement concerning the reduction of funded 
debt is not true in its entirety. (For an analysis of 
railway capitalization from 1890 to 1938 see Table XIII 
and Chart II • ) 
From 1890 to 1929 operating expenses increased 
by about 666 per cent, and taxes increased by lJ40· per 
cent. During this same period interest on funded debt 
increased by 264 per cent, and operating revenues increas-
ed by 606 per cent. It is, therefore, apparent that 
interest charges did not keep pace proportionately to the 
other increases. As a result, they would automatically 
be reduced as a percentage cost of total revenues. 
Chart II shows clearly that no real reduction in funded 
debt occurred during this period. 
A comparison of revenue per dollar of capitali-
zation exclusive of surplus* also reveals fundamental 
changes which occurred in the railway structure during 
this period. It also helps to prove that Mr. Moulton's 
contention is wrong. ·rn 1890 the railways received one 
dollar of revenue for every nine dollars of capitaliza-
tion (exclusive of surplus), ~nile in 1929 they received 
* Surplus excluded because accurate figures not 
available in 1890. 
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one dollar of revenue for every $J.70 of capitalizat.ion 
(exclusive of surplus). It is, therefore, e.pparent that 
not even a proportionate reduction of debt would be 
necessary to reveal the statistics of interest on funded 
debt declining from 21 per cent of operating -revenues in 
1890 to 9.1 per cent in 1929. It is obvious that Mr. 
Moulton has made. an error in assuming causal relation-
ship where none e.xists. 
The above discussion presents a fair analysis 
of railway expense and income items from 1890 to the 
present time. The failure of the railways to obtain as 
good an operating ratio in 1929, our most prosperous year, 
as before 1910 indicates some of the fundamental weak-
nesses whioh were developing in the railroad picture from 
about 1915 to that time. When industrial concerns fail 
to recover in periods of prosperity as muoh as business 
in general, and in periods of .depression decline relative-
ly more than business in general, investors and analysts 
characterize them as being in the "old age" or "failing 
health" group. Technically we could say they were in the 
state of secular decline. This, I believe, could be said 
of the railroads in general since 1915. 
About 1915, several factors began to enter the 
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railroad picture which tended to make them less and less 
attractive as an investment media. In general, we can 
enumerate these factors as follows: 
1. Development of passenger automobiles. 
2. Higher taxes. 
J, Government taking over railroads in the 
war period. 
4. Inflexible rate structures. 
~. Development of truck competition. 
6. Development of pipeline systems. 
7. Sticky wage rates. 
With these factors in general tending to darken 
the railroad picture, we entered in 19JO probably the 
worst business depression this eountry has ever seen. 
Prior to 1929 it was the common assumption 
among investors that railways offered the best media of 
hedging against depression and deflation tendencies. They 
were considered by many to be relatively depression-proof. 
We know now that their judgment was fallacious. What were 
the primary or fundamental errors involved to make these 
opinions wrong in the ensuing depression years? 
In the following table the estimated capitali-
zation of non-financial corporations by groups is present-
ed for 1931. By using the 100 per cent analysis method(!} 
we find that funded debt represented almost 49 per cent of 
(!) For an excellent discussion of the 100 per cent analy-
sis method of analyzing financial statements, see 
A. Wall, How to Evaluate Financial Statements (Harper 
& Brothers, New York, 1936) 
Bonded Debt 
TABLE X 
ESTIMATED CAPITALIZATION OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS 
1931( 1) 
(Millions of Dollars} 
Public 
%- of Rail- % of Utili-
Total roads T-ot~l ties 
-
48.7 14,264 )9.1 14,481 
Net 
'r 
Preferred Stock ) Worth ( 7.0 2,049 ( 10.5 
% of 
Total 
12.4 
( 11.9 
Common Stock ) 51 •. 3 ( .27.) 8,031 3,511 60.9 ( )6.1 11,879 87.6 ( 49.5 
Surplus ) ( .~ ~.291 (~ 4,8~! ( 26.2 oo.o ·29 ,JJ5 o.o 34, T ioo.o 
Indus-
trials 
10,~24 
10,067 
41,790 
22.218 
84,599 
{ 1) Railroad data taken from Statistics of the Railways in the United States 
(1939) P.s-142; Public Utility and Industrial data from Moody1 s Manuel-
of Investments (1932) Steam Railroads, P.a9; Percentage figures by author 
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the total capitalization of railroads. Net worth or 
equity capital constituted 51 per cent, and this is di-
vided into preferred stock, common stock, and surplus 
as follows: 7 per cent , 27 per cent, and 17 per cent 
respectively. 
In contrast to the railroads' capitalization, 
we find the utilities (which were the most depression-
proof relatively) with 39 per cent of their capitaliza-
tion in the form of funded debt and 61 per cent in 
equity or net worth. The net worth consisted of 10.5 
per cent preferred stock, )6.1 per cent common stock, 
and 14.3 per cent surplus. The residual equity. of the 
common stockholders was, therefore, 50.4 per cent in the 
case of the utilities as contrasted to 44.3 per cent in 
the ease of the railroads. History bas proved the sound-
ness of this conservative policy on the part of the 
utilities. 
If we now examine the industrials group, we 
find that only 1:2.4 per cent of their capitalization was 
in the for.m of tunded debt and that 87.6 per cent was in 
the form of invested capital. Of the invested capital, 
we find 12 per cent in preferred stock, 50 per cent in 
common stock, and 26 per cent in the form or surplus. In 
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other words, the residual equity of the owners of in-
dustrial concerns in 1931 amounted to 75.7 per cent of 
total capitalization in contrast to 50.4 per cent in 
the utilities group and 44.J per cent in the case of the 
railroads. 
By allowing the relatively heavy proportion of 
debt in relation to total capitalization, the railroad 
managements assumed that in general they would suffer 
less from any depression shock than would either the 
utilities or the industrials. We must assume this was 
the attitude of railway managements because - if it were 
not - then they were really foolhardy and were inviting 
disaster. 
Now that we have examined the capitalization of 
the three major groups of non-financial institutions as 
they existed in the forepart of the Great Depression, let 
us now turn and examine the experience which the rail-
roads encountered in the years from 1919 up to the present 
time, based on carloadings, and compare this to the ex-
perience of all manufacturers, based on total manufactur-
ing production as computed by the Federal Reserve Board. 
The following table presents an index of car-
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loadings by months from 1919 through September, 1940. 
The years 19'2.3-1925 a:re used as a base and assumed to be 
100~ An examination of the table revelas that carload-
ings in the depression GJf 19.21 dropped to 73 per cent or 
the 192.3-1925 average. Ir · we compute the arithmetic 
mean for the entire year, we find that carloadings for 
the year were 77.7 per cent of the average. 
To enable us to compare carloadings with busi-
ness in general, we can compare the monthly index of oar-
loadings in Table XI with the quarterly index of manu-
racturing production appearing in Table I of the first 
chapter. Both indices have 19:23-1925 as their base year. 
To facilitate comparison of these indices, I 
have computed the index for the total year using the 
simple arithmetic mean. The comparison of manufacturing 
production and carloadings appear in Table XII. 
When we compare the indices of carloadings and 
manufacturing production appearing in Table XII, we find 
that in 1919 both indices were at approximately the same 
level. In 1920 they both increased, but the carloadings 
index increased about 2 per cent more than did the manu-
facturing index. The indices reveal that manufacturing 
production declined more than did carloadings in the 
TABLE XI 
INDEX OF FREIGHT CARLOADINGS( 1) 
192,-1925 Average • 100 
Year ~ ~ Mar Apr May June July Aue; Sept 2.<:1 ID!! ~ 
- -
1919 81 80 76 80 81 81 92 89 9.3 89 8) 90 
1920 91 90 93 83 89 90 95 95 9.3 91 91 90 
1921 77 77 TJ 76 78 77 77 79 81 85 76 75 
19.22 77 84 87 75 79 82 81 8.2 89 90 95 98 
192.3 98 97 100 105 102 102 101 101 98 98 99 95 
1924 98 103 98 95 93 92 92 95 100 102 101 101 
1925 10J 102 99 102 101 10.2 10.3 106 102 101 105 108 
1926 103 104 104 105 107 108 109 106 107 109 110 109 
1927 107 108 108 106 105 104 10) 104 104 101 99 98 
1928 103 102 lOJ 101 104 101 104 105 106 107 109 107 
19,29 108 109 106 108 107 109 108 110 108 105 102 101 
1930 100 100 96 97 95 94 91 91 88 81 84 8.2 
1931 81 77 79 79 78 76 75 72 68 68 67 65 
1932 62 60 58 57 52 49 '49 51 54 57 56 54 
TABLE XI (continued) 
INDEX OF FREIGHT CARLOADINGS( 1) 
1923-1925 Average • 100 
Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oot Nov Deo 
- - - - - - - -
1933 53 52 48 53 55 61 66 64 60 59 60 60 
1934 62 65 65 63 64 64 62 61 60 59 59 60 
1935 6) 66 65 62 61 64 59 6) 64 68 68 68 
1936 70 71 66 71 12 73 76 76 75 77 82 83 
1937 80 82 8) 84 80 76 80 79 78 76 71 67 
19)8 65 6.2 60 57 58 58 61 62 64 68 69 69 
1939 69 67 66 60 62 67 69 70 77 so 82 78 
1940 78 73 69 70 12. 75 75 76 77 
fiT BoarC3.of- GOvernors of Federal Reserve System, Seasonally Adjusted Index of 
Daily Average Volume of Loadings, Based on Data Collected by Association of 
American Railroads - Statistics for 1919 to 19)8 taken from TNEC Reports, 
Economic Prologue, p. 211 
1939 figures from Supplement to Survey of Current Business (1940~ p. 84 
1940 figures from Survey of Current Business (Dec. 1940), p. 37 
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depression of 1921, manufacturing declining to 66 per 
cent while carloadings stood at 78 per cent. In 1922 and 
1923 the correlation between the two indices was almost 
perfect, but the slight depression of 1924 found manu-
facturing declining to 93 per cent while ca.rloa.dings 
declined only 2 per cent, or to 97.5. In other words, in 
these first two minor depressions, we find railroads less 
vulnerable to depression shocks than manufacturing. 
In 1925 and 1926 both indices improved, and 
again the correlation was almost perfect. However, in 
the slight depression of 1927 we find carloadings fell 
off 4.2 per cent from the previous year and manufacturing 
declined only 2.8 per cent. In 1928 and 1929 we find that 
both indices improved but that manufacturing improved much 
more relat.i vely than car loadings, the manufacturing index 
reaching 121 per cent while carloadings failed to reach 
the 108 per cent level. 
From 1929 to 1932 we find that both indices de-
clined, and this time both declined about as much propor-
tionately from their 1929 level, but carloadings actually 
declined to 55 per cent of the base average while manu-
facturing never penetrated the 64 per cent level. 
Year 
-
1919 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
19:24 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
19)1 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
19)8 
1939 
1940 * 
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TABLE XII 
COMPARISON OF INDICES GF RAILROAD CARLOADINGS 
AND MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION(!) 
(192:3-1925 average = 100) 
Railroad Manuracturing 
Car1oadings Production 
84.6 84.2 
90.9 89.0 
77.7 66.3 
84.9 85.0 
97.6 101.4 
97.5 92.9 
103.0 104 • .3 
108.1 108.4 
10).9 105.6 
105.2 110.4 
107.8 120.9 
91.1 96.8 
73.8 80.9 
54.9 64.1 
')7.6 76.') 
62.0 76.9 
64.2 89.4 
74.2 103.9 
78.0 111.2 
62.8 81.4 
70.7 104.1 
72. '3 117.5 
(l) Arithmetic mean used in computation; original data 
appears in Tables I and XI 
* Based on first nine months' figures 
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In the recovery years from 1933 to 1937, we 
find that manufacturing greatly improved until in 1937 
it was 111 per cent of the 1923-1925 average, and the 
railroads improved to only 78 per cent of this average. 
The depression of 1938 found earloadings declining to 
6) per cent of the average, but manufacturing declined 
to only 81 per cent. Recovery in 1939 and 1940 found the 
same divergence in the indices as occurred in the recov-
ery of 19.33-1937. Carloadings improved to only 72.) per 
cent and manufacturing reached 117~S. 
~his comparison reveals that in the early 20's 
the railroads tended to be more depression-proof than did 
manufacturing in general, but that in 19.27 the railroads 
were tending to become more vulnerable, and by the time 
the Great Depression occurred they were much more vul-
nerable to depression shocks than manufacturing as a 
whole. The lack of recovery possibilities of the rail-
roads are also revealed in the years 1933 to 1937 and 
1939-1940 when the figures of carloadings are compared 
to those of manufacturing production. 
Let us now return for a moment to again consid-
er the capitalization statistics of Tailroads, utilities, 
and industrials tor 19)1. Hindsight is always, of course, 
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better than foresight, but when we consider that in 1931 
49 per cent of the railroads' capitalization was repre-
sented by funded debt and that only 12.4 per cent of the 
capitalization of industrial concerns was represented by 
long-term debt, I believe that a glaring fundamental 
weakness should have been revealed to railroad manage-
ments in the light of what had :happened even previous to 
1929. 
We have examined the capitalization statistics 
of our three main groups of non-financial organizations 
in l9Jl, and we have seen that in the light of fluctua-
tions in business activity and carloadings that the rail-
roads had too much of their capitalization in the torm of 
:tunded debt. Let us now turn and examine the trend at 
the capitalization of railroads from 1890 up to the pres-
ent time. 
In Table XIII are presented capitalization 
statistics of railroads from 1890 through 19J8. Data as 
to the surplus of railroads was unavailable prior to 1910 
and, of course, is not presented. In conjunction with 
Table XIII one should study Chart II which presents in 
graphic form a 100 per oent analysis of railway capital-
ization from 1911 through 1938. A glance at this table 
Per Cent 
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TABLE XIII 
CAPITALIZATION OF STEAM . RAILROADS ( 1) 
1890 ... 19J8 (in millions) 
Common Preferred 
~ stock ~ stock ~ Surplus ~ Funded Debt ~ Total ~ 
1890 J,SOJ 606 4,575 
91 3;796 655 4.840 
92 3;979 654 5, 053 
93( Jure) J, 982 687 5,226 
94 4,104 730 5,357 
95 " 4,202 760 5,385 96 4,257 970 5,340 
97 4, 367 998 5,270 
98 4,269 1,119 5,431 
99 4,323 1,192 5,519 
1900 4, 52:2 1,323 5,646 
01 4,475 1,331 5;882 
02 4;722 1,302 6,110 
OJ 4;877 1,.279 6,444 
04 5,051 1,289 6;873 
05 5;181 1,)7) 7 ,.251 
06 5,403 1,401 7,766 
07 51933 1;424 8,725 
08 5,911 1,46·; 9,394 
09 6,218 1,468 9,802 
1910 6,710 1,40) 10,)04 
11 7,075 . 34 11396 6 1,54:2 8 10,738 52 .20,751 100 
12 7,249 . 33 1;374 6 1,58J 8 11,1)0 5J 21,JJ6 100 
1) 7,232 JJ 1,379 6 1,767 8 11,185 53 21,563 100 
TABLE XIII ( cont i~ue d) 
CAPITALIZATION OF STEAM RAILROADS 
1890 - 1938 {in millions) 
Common Pre:t'erred 
~ Stock ~ Stock ~ SurJ2ltl,S :& Funded Debt ~ Total ! 
1914 71304 JJ 1;376 7 1,648 7 11,567 5J 2ljS95 100 
15 7;600 .34 11395 7 1;157 
' 
12)1)3 54 22,285 100 
16 7,60) 34 1,456 6 1,935 8 12,03.3 52 23,027 100 
16 7,594 .3.3 1,455 6 2,159 9 12 ,000 52 2),208 100 
17 7,454 )2 1,848 8 2,715 10 11;947 50 2.3,964 100 
18 7,249 30 1;806 7 .3,561 15 11,730 48 24,.346 100 
19 7,19.3 30 1;898 . 8 2,899 12 11,859 49 :2.3,847 100 
1920 7,215 .30 1,898 8 .3,086 12 12;778 50 '24,977 100 
21 7,275 28 1;801 7 .3,098 1.3 13,216 52 25,.390 100 
22 7,307 28 1;834 7 .3 ,291 14 1.3,149 51 25,581 100 
23 7,.398 28 1;854 7 3., 546 14 lJ, 589 51 26,.387 100 
24 7,539 :28 1,8J5 7 .3,784 13 14,162 52 27,.320 100 
25 7,602 28 1,937 7 4,126 14 14,105 51 27,770 100 
26 7;560 27 1,925 7 4,553 16 14,192 50 28,230 100 
27 7,683 28 1;980 7 4,692 17 13,951 51 27,.306 100 
28 7,809 28 2,0.34 7 5,049 17 1),904 48 28,796 100 
29 7,85.3 28 2,065 6 5,472 18 14,065 48 29,455 100 
19.30 8,009 .27 2;074 7 5,345 18 14,248 48 29,685 100 
Jl 8,0.31 .28 2,049 7 4,993 17 14,264 48 29,337 100 
32 8,067 28 2,047 . 7 4,6;; 15 14,72.3 50 29;492 100 
3.3 8~057 28 .2,042 7 4,426 15 14,624 50 29 149 100 , . 
34 7,994 . 28 2,044 7 4,121 14 14,532 51 28,491 100 
35 7,987 28 2, Q.36 7 .3,921 14 14,224 50 28,168 100 
J6 7,993 29 2,0g6 7 .3,749 13 13,974 50 27',812 100 
.37 8,064 .29 2,050 7 .3,499 1.3 14,009 .51 27,622 100 
.38 8,040 JO 2,049 8 .3, 073 11 13,766 51 26,928 100 
{lJ ~ata from the annual Statistics of Railwals in the United States, Interstate 
Commerce Commission (1922) p. LXXXIII; 1930, p.S.-116; 1939, p.S.-134 
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and chart reveals that no real percentage reduction in 
debt has occurred during the entire period. 
In 1911 funded debt amounted to 10,7J8 millions 
or 52 per cent of total railway capitalization, and in 
1938 funded debt amounted to 13,766 millions or 51 per 
cent - a decline over a period of 27 years of only 1 per 
cent. The lowest point which the funded debt ever reach-
ed was in the three-year period of 19:28-1930 when it 
declined to 48 per cent. 
These statistics could be elaborated upon for 
several pages, but I believe they tell the story of how 
and why we have had so many railroad failures in the 
past decade. The answer is that railroad managements 
were oblivious to changing dynamic conditions. They were 
operating and managing an industry during this period 
which had slowly but surely begun to die. Railroad man-
agement in general failed to recognize this, and the 
result has been frequent bankruptcies since 1930. 
It would seem that the depression of the early 
30's would have taught these managements a lesson, and 
yet there are many examples of railroads which lost money 
all through the depression; they were, however, able to 
survive, and when a semblance of prosperity appeared in 
I 
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1935 to 1937, they paid their earnings out in dividends 
while, at the same time, one could see their bonds sell-
ing in the open market at less than 75 per cent of par 
value!! 
The answer to a situation of this type must be 
either downright incompetence on the part of managements, 
or they see that they are "stuck" with a fundamentally 
unsound situation; and when they have an opportunity to 
get some return on their original investment they seize 
it, because they think they will never again have the 
opportunity. 
* * * 
This chapter has dealt with the problems ot 
the railroads as a whole. We have not as yet examined 
objective examples. In preparation for the examination 
or these examples, we have analyzed the problems, trends 
of operations, capitalization, etc. of the railroad 
industry as a whole. 
The operating ratio was .presented in the early 
part of' the chapter. A study of this ratio 'for the 
years 1890 to 19J8 revealed that the railroads operated 
under much more favorable conditions from 1890 to 1912 
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than in most of the years since that time. It also re-
vealed that in not one year of the so-called prosperous 
1920's did the ratio reach as favorable a level as in 
the worst year prior to 1914. 
Later in the chapter we discussed the compara-
tive capitalization of non-financial corporations in 
19Jl. We found that, contrary to popular opinion, rail-
roads were less stable in the depression than industrial 
concerns as a whole, and yet they allowed almost one-hal~ 
of their capitalization to exist in the form of debt, 
whereas the industrial concerns had only about 12 per 
cent of their capitalization in the for.m of debt. 
When we examined the capitalization of the 
railraods as a whole for the years 1890 to 19)8 we found 
an excessive amount of financing being done by means of 
debt . flotation. We also found that the managements o~ 
the roads paid little attention to the size of their debt 
and regarded it more as a perpetuity than something to be 
reduced as quickly as possible. 
The answer to this attitude on the part of 
management has been numerous bankruptcies and receiver-
ships. Is there anything to be done that can save our 
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remaining railroads which have thus far avoided the 
bankruptcy courts? This question will be discussed in 
the next chapter through the study of a number of our 
"borderline railroads". 
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CHAPTER III 
Borderline Railroads 
In the two previous chapters we have been con-
cerned only with theory and generalities in the economic 
picture as a whole and with the railroads collectively. 
In this chapter we shall attempt to use objective examples, 
e.nd from the study of these, arrive at a conclusion as to 
a constructive plan for placing the roads which are, or 
occasionally are, in financial difficulty upon a more sound 
financial basis. 
When we studied the income and expense items and 
the capitalization of the American railroads as a whole, we 
received a fair appraisal of how the railroads collectively 
stood, both from an operating and from a financial organi-
zation viewpoint. When we use averages, however, as we 
have done, we fail to see how the roads as independent 
units compare. 
For our objective examples I have used the forty 
largest railroads in the United States. As for the period, 
I have chosen the last three years for which complete 
figures are available. One of these years, 1938, was a de-
pression year; 1937 was a prosperity year; and 1939 was a 
mediocre year. As a result, we have three represent at! ve 
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years in which to examine these railroads' financial 
experience. 
In the follovdng table are presented these rail-
roads in the order of their size, operating revenue being 
used as the criterion of size. The roads which are starred 
failed to earn their fixed charges in one or more years in 
the last t'hree. An examinati_on reveals there are only 
thirteen railroads which are not starred. 
In other words, . twenty-seven of the forty largest 
railroads in the country failed to earn their fixed charges 
in one or more years of the last three. For the purpose of 
this discussion, let us assume that each of these roads is 
a borderline case or worse and omit from the discussion 
those roads which earned their charges in each year of the 
last three. The term, "borderline railroad", is used to 
describe those roads which are not yet in receivership or 
trusteeship but which, according to their past performance, 
are very close to receivership. In bad years they fail to 
cover fixed charges, but in good years they normally cover 
fixed charges more than once. 
or these twenty-seven roads which failed to show 
a satisfactory record in the last three years, we find 
that the following have gone into receivership or trustee-
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TABLE XIV 
Percentage of Fixed Charges Earned (1) 
by the Forty Largest Railroads in 
1937. 1938, and 1939 
12.21 ill.§. 19 39 
Pennsylvania Railroad 134 114 140 
* New York Central 112 59 109 
* Southern Pacific 102 78 120 
Union Pacific .224 230 232 
* Baltimore & Ohio (a) 151 92 148 
Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe 158 162 165 
Chesapeake & Ohio 467 J26 387 
Illinois Central 112 107 114 
* Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific 66 41 64 
* Southern Railway 105 97 138 
Chicago, Burlington & ~uincy 151 137 138 
Norfolk & Western 1,~84 1,047 1,528 
Great Northern l6J 119 161 
Louisville & Nashville 174 129 178 
* Chicago & North Western 11 8 45 
* New York, New Haven & Hartford 47 16 78 
* Missouri Pacific 58 JO 37 
* Erie 97 25 89 
* Chicago, Rook Island & Pacific 34 20 41 
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TABLE XIV (continued) 
Percentage of Fixed Charges Earned(l) 
by the Forty Largest Railroads in 
1937 1 l9J~f. and 1939 
* Northern Pacific 
Reading 
* Delaware, Lackawana & Western 
* St. Louis & San Francisco 
* Atlantic Coastline 
* Boston & Maine 
* Lehigh Valley 
* Wabash 
* Seaboard Air Line 
*New York, Chicago & St. Louis 
* Central Railroad of New Jersey 
* Pere Marquette 
* Missouri-Kansas-Texas 
'l'exas & Pacific 
* Long Island 
* Delaware & Hudson 
*Denver & Rio _Grande Western 
* Grand Trunk Western 
.1211 
.101 
181 
i'S8 
J8 
138 
10J 
88 
60 
50 
136 
58 
150 
78 
172 
a 
75 
1 
- 88 
70 
139 
49 
10 
71 
J1 
55 
20 
19 
85 
12 
JJ 
:26 
136 
(d) 
96 
8 
(d) 
101 
157 
93 
31 
113 
110 
99 
52 
41 
148 
47 
110 
36 
125 
21 
139 
35 
49 
Virginian 
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TABLE XIV (continued) 
Percentage of Fixed Charges Earned(l) 
by the Forty Largest Railroads in 
19'27,- 1938 1 a,nd 1939 
illl ~ 
392 335 
* St. Louis Southwestern 71 69 
Pittsburgh & Lake Erie 7,.546 4,074 
12~2 
388 
37 
9,160 
* Railroads which tailed to cover fixed charges in any 
year, n.oting it as being a borderline road or worse. 
(a) Allowing for debt readjustment in 19.39; without read-justment,coverage would have been 98 in 1937, 59 in 
1938, and 9.2 in 1939 --
(d) Deficit 
{1) Table appeared in Business Week, (April 27, 1940) p. 24; 
data taken from Standard Statistics Company 
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ship during the past seven or eight years: 
Railroads in Hands of (1) 
Receivers or Trustees 
Mileage 
Railroad Operated 
Central Railroad of 
New Jersey 710 
Chicago & North Western 8,J29 
Chicago, Milwaukee, 
St. Paul & Pacific 10,890 
Chicago, Rock Island & 
Pacific 7,839 
Denver & Rio Grande 
Western 2,.580 
Erie 2,148 
Missouri Pacific 7,179 
New York, New Raven &. 
Hartford 1,879 
St. Louis & San Fran-
cisco 4,824 
St. Louis, Southwestern 
& Affiliated Cos. 1,690 
Seaboard Air Line 4,J1S 
Wabash 2,409 
Date of 
Receivership 
Mileage or 
Owned Trusteeship 
389 10/J0/39 
8,096 6/28/35 
9,910 6/29/35 
5,087 6/7/JJ 
2.286 11/1/35 
856 1/19/38 
6,294 4/1/JJ 
1,:211 l0/23/35 
4,639 11/1/32 
1~486 12/12/35 
3,Jj6 12/23/30 
1,976 12/1/Jl 
(1) Financial & eommercial Chronicle (January 27, 1940), p, 701 
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We find that the roads vmich are in receiver-
ship operate about 55, 00 miles of track and own over 
45,000 miles The earliest receivership of 
this group in the depr Seaboard Air Line which 
went into receivership in December of 1930. The latest 
receivership was t~at 
Taxation was the 
Central Railway of New Jersey. 
single factor causing this 
failure. .In the early years of the depression and before, 
investment men to this road as the "Jersey Lily" 
because it was 
table reveals that thi 
and operated only 710 
gross revenue it 
United States. 
A glance at the previous 
road owned only 389 miles of track 
iles of track. Yet in point of 
thirtieth largest railroad in the 
Since the erstate Commerce Commission and the 
Federal courts have ju isdiction over the railroads which 
are in receivership ~r trusteeship, there is nothing that 
we can do about them. First one committee representing 
one issue of bonds pre ents a plan for reorganization which 
favors that committee; then another committee representing 
a different issue of b nds either files an objection to the 
first plan or presents a new plan for reorganization which 
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favors them. Since fi e or ten bond issues are not un-
usual in a large railr ad, the prolongment of these bank-
ruptcy cases becomes q ite apparent. About two or three 
years after the variou plans of reorganization have been 
filed the Interstate C mmerce Commission presents a plan 
for reorganization and recapitalization which is supposed 
to be equitable to all the bondholders, but then we find 
they have decided to " p~ out" the preferred and common 
stockholders, and immediately we see them file an objeo-
t ion because the engineering fi.:r;m of XYZ has just apprais-
ed the property of the railroad and finds there is 
$123,497,563.17 in equity which should rightfully be given 
to the preferred and common stockholders in any recapital-
ization plan. And so it goes. Once a railroad bas gone 
into receivership it seems the only ones who stand to 
benefit.. are the lawyers. 
We shall now drop from our discussion those 
roads which are in the courts and focus our attention upon 
those roads whose earning records have been unsatisfactory 
in some years but which have as yet avoided getting entangled 
in the bankruptcy courts. · 
Ot the forty largest railroads which appeared in 
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the original table, thirteen had satisfactory earning 
records, twelve are in receivership or trusteeship, and 
fifteen remain for our discussion. They are as follows: 
New York Central 
Southern Pacific 
Baltimore & Ohi0* 
Southern Railway 
Northern Pacific 
Delaware, Lackawana 
& Western 
Atlantic Coastline 
Boston & Maine 
Lehigh Valley* 
New York, Chicago & 
st. Louis 
Pere Marquette 
Missouri-Kansas-Texas 
Long Island 
Delaware & Hudson 
· Grand Trunk Western 
* Filed under Chafter XV of the Federal 
Bankruptcy Act Chandler Act) to be 
discussed later. 
Before we take up each of these roads individ-
ually and examine their financial structure, + believe it 
would be well to consider one of these roads which has 
been within the past year voluntarily recapitalized with 
the aid of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (herein-
after referred to as the RFC). This railroad is the 
Boston & Maine. A discussion of its operations over the 
past years and its financial structure before and after re-
capitalization is presented in the following paragraphs. 
The Boston & Maine Plan 
of Recapitalization · 
The Boston & Maine operates in a · relatively 
densely populated area, and serves central and northern 
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New England, including the central and northern part ot 
Massachusetts, nearly all of New Hampshire, southeastern 
Maine, and a part of Ver.mont. Its lines extend into 
New York State and connect with the trunk lines to the 
South and West, and connect New England with the main 
routes to the coal fields. 
At't er two reorganizations, in 1919 and 1925, the 
latter a voluntary one, which involved the extension of a 
large amount of its obligations maturing prior to l9JJ and 
raising a substantial amount of new capital, the road ac-
complished much in the way of rehabilitation of property 
and restoration of earning power. 
Although the depression record of the Boston & 
Maine was better than that of the railroads as a whole, 
the heavy funded debt proved to be a burden, the support 
of which deprived the capital stock of earning power dur-
ing the depression and since. The road receives the larg-
est part of its revenues for hauling manufactured goode 
and miscellaneous freight - more than 40 per cent in normal 
times. Next in order of importance are mining products -
around 20 per cent, and agricultural products and animals 
18 to 20 per cent.(l) 
(1) ·Poor's Railroad Manuel (1940) p. 1723 
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Net income fell from a net profit of $5,994,000 
in 1929 to a net loss of $5,099,600 in 19)8. However, 
this loss was directly due to increased expenses and 
losses caused by floods in that year. Fixed charges were 
earned in every year of the depression up to 1936 when 
they were earned only .78 times. However, recovery 
occurred in 1937, and fixed charges were covered 1.03 
times in that year. Coverage slumped to .31 times in 
1938, but sharp recovery took place in 1939. Despite 
heavy snow removal costs and a coal strike in the latter 
year, a net income of t707,882 was shown and fixed charges 
were covered 1.10 times. 
The road's capitalization before the readjust-
ment plan was top-heavr, and the structure is still unduly 
complicated by several issues of preferred stock. Funded 
debt outstanding per mile of track is decidedly heavy, but 
the disadvantages of this are somewhat offset by the 
thickly populated nature of the territory served and by 
the relatively heavy traffic density.(1) 
A very brief balanoe sheet of the Boston & Maine 
is presented below as it existed before the recapitalization 
plan was consummated. 
( 1) fbid., p. 1724 
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Boston & Maine Railroad 
Balance Sheet December 31, 1939 
Assets 
Current Assets-. 
Deterred Assets 
Unadjusted Debits 
Total Investment in Road 
and Equipment and 
Improvemen~ s 
Total Assets 
Liabilities 
Current Liabilities 
Stockholders Equity 
Funded Debt held by Public 
Unadjusted Credits 
Total Liabilities 
$12,200,000 
.2,100' 000 
35,700,000 
220,\00,000 
$270,100,000 
26,600,000 
104,600,000 
117,800,000 
21,100,000 
$.270 J 100 J 000 
The following table, Table XV, is a bond tab-
ulation of that portion of the Boston & Maine's funded 
debt which will cause the company serious financial 
embarrassment in the near future. This table reveals 
that over $JO,OOO,OOO of funded debt is maturing within 
five years from Deoember 31, 1939. 
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TABLE XV 
Tabulatioa of Boston & Maine Bonds 
Maturing within Five Years 
Title of Issue 
Vt. Valley RR 1st Mtge. 
B & M RR Gen. Mtge. Series 
Series 
Series 
"Q" 
"R" 
"S" 
B & M RR Gen. Mtge. Series "T" 
Series "U" 
B & M RR Gen. Mtge. Series "V" 
Series "W" 
Series "X" 
B &. M RR Gen. Mtge. Series "Y" 
Series "Z" 
Conn. Riv. RR Gen. Mtge. 
Sull. Co. RR 1st Mtge. 
B & M RR Gen. 4~s 
'' " " " " Series "AA" 
Series "BB" 
Maturity 
October ) 
February ) 
May )1940 
September) 
September) 
November )1941 
Maroh 
April 
July 
) 
)1942 ) 
January ) 
May (1943 
September) 
April 
January 
April 
April 
) 
)1944 
) 
) 
Bonds maturing in 1940 - $4,885,000 
1941 - 6,341,000 
1942 - 3,728,000 
1943 - 3,457,000 
1944 - 12,178,000 
Total bonds maturing 
in next five years -$30,589,000 
Outstanding 
12/31/39 
• 1,500,000 
245,000 
2,640,000 
~00,000 4,85,ooo 
5,841,000 
500,000 
6, .341,000 
1,897,000 
1,649,000 
182,000 
3, 728,000 
958,000 
1,538,000 
961,000 
3,457,ooo 
357,000 
5,554,000 
6,097,000 
1,0,000 12,1 8,000 
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On December 31, 1939 the current position o~ 
the Boston & Maine was as ~allows: 
Current Assets 
Cash 
.Accounts Receivable 
Materials and Supplies 
Other Current Assets 
Total current assets 
Current Liabilities 
Loans from RFC due February 1, 
1940 
Other Loans and Bills Payable 
Accounts and Wages Payable 
Traffic and Car Service Balance 
Payable 
Unmatured Interest Accrued 
Other Current Liabilities 
Total Current Liabilities 
$ 4,100,000 
1,900,000 
.3,.350,000 
2,850,000 
$12,200,000 
11,000,000 
5,500,000 
4,700,000 
2,000,000 
1,400,000 
2,000,000 $26,l>r5o,ooo 
The 30.5 millions of bonds due in five years 
plus the 11 millions . due to the RFC in one month, and the 
other loans and bills payable total approximately 47 
million dollars. To pay this, the balance sheet reveals 
the road had about 4.1 millions in cash. 
It is obvious that the Boston & Maine was head-
ing straight ror receivership. The RFC re~sed to loan 
the road any more money or to extend the maturity of its 
loan unless the road succeeded in reorganizing its 
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financial structure and cutting down its fixed charges. 
The fact that the Boston & Maine bonds were selling in 
the open market at about 45 to 50 per cent of par reveals 
how investors, in general, regarded the credit of the 
road. 
Officials of the RFC and of the Boston & Maine, 
and interests representing certain large bondholders 
formulated a plan which, I believe, was very constructive 
and could with certain adjustments be applied to many 
other railroads which are certain to become entan~ed in 
financial difficulties unless they change their financial 
policies, or unless railroads in general gr~atly increase 
their revenues, ·which is quite unlikely. 
'!'he following is a brief outline ··of the Boston 
& Maine recapitalization plan as it was presented to bond-
holders for approval on November 7, 1939. Under the plan 
announced by Jesse H. Jones, the Federal Loan Agency Ad-
ministrator, holders of the outstanding $103,833,000 First 
Mortgage bonds were to receive in exchange for each $1,000 
bond originally held, one $500 30-year 4 per cent Income 
bond and one $500 .20-year First Mortgage bond, or they 
could, instead of receiving the First Mortgage bond, ac-
cept $500 in cash. In case too many people elected to 
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take cash, a pro rata distribution of cash and mortgage 
bonds was provided, but it was estimated that at least 
$300 in cash would be available forthose who desired 
cash. 
To provide this cash the RFC agreed to buy at 
par up to $40,750,000 of the new 20-year 4 per cent Mort-
gage bonds to pay off Boston & Maine's debt ·· o:r $14, 750,000 
··~ 
to the RFC and the balance, not exceeding $26,000,000, to 
provide cash for the present holders of bonds who did not 
elect to accept new Mortgage bonds for 50 per cent o:r 
their holdings, and to pay of:f $5,500,000 bank loans at 
par and accrued interest. 
The Savings Banks Association of Massachusetts 
called a meeting on November 22 ot representatives Which 
held the company's bonds for the purpose of adopting a 
policy in regard to the recapitalization plan. These banks 
represented a large portion o:r the outstanding bonds. The 
·banks advised the company to change the 4 per cent Income 
bonds to 4~ per cent; and if this were done they agreed to 
accept the plan. The Boston & Maine soon announced the 
change in the new Income bonds :from 4 to 4~ per cent. 
4 per cent o:f the 4~ per cent would be cumulative. 
'!'he proposed new securities to be issued under 
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the plan were as follows: 
First Mortgage bonds duel960-
Series "RR" 
Income Mo~gage bonds due 1970 -
Series "A" 
Total Funded Debt 
* Assuming that all bonds and 
secured notes assented to 
the plan. 
$72,159,880 * 
A constructive feature of the plan was that it 
not only provided a reduction in fixed charges but that 
it provided for a capital fund after fixed charges for 
property rehabilitation and for a sinking fund which would 
result in a material scaling-down of the debt structure of 
the company over a period of years. 
The capital fund charges were placed directly 
after the fixed charges; these charges amounted to a maxi-
mum of $1,000,000 per annum. 
Following the capital fund oharges were the 
sinking fund charges which were to be used for the retire-
ment of the First Mortgage bonds. The amount tor this 
fund was set at 1 per cent of the maximum amount of the 
outstanding Series "RR" bonds, and this was approximated 
to be about $721,599 per annum, asSUming all the outstand-
ing bonds and notes assented to the plan. The money in 
the sinking fund was to be used pro rata for the holders 
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of the bonds, namely, the RFC and the public. The pay-
ments to the RFC were to be made in cash and those to 
the public in either cash or Mortgage bonds which the 
company had acquired in the open market. This allowed 
the company, if possib~e, to buy its bonds at a discount 
in the open market. This, in turn, would tend to sup-
port and stabilize the price of the bonds. 
FolloWing the sinking fund payment came the 
interest on the Income bonds which was estimated to be 
about $2,335,000. A final provision for additional 
earnings placed a sinking fund on these Income bonds of 
1 per cent of the maximum amount outstanding. This was 
estimated to be about $519,000. Earnings in excess of 
these amounts could be used for general corporate pur-
poses. 
In order to determine the value of the proposed 
new securities, it was necessary to recapitulate the 
income and fixed charges account for previous years as it 
would have been had the plan then been in effect. The 
proposed charges under the new capitalization were as 
follows: 
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Income available for fixed 
charges 
Fixed Charges 
Rent for leased roads 
Interest on Equipment 
obligations 
Interest on New First 
Mortgage Bonds 
Interest on Unfunded Debt 
Total Fixed Charges 
Times charges earned 
Income available for other 
purposes 
Capital fUnd maximum 
First Mort~age Bond Sinking 
Fund ( 1%) 
Interest on Income Mortgage 
Bonds 
Income Mortgage Sinking 
Fund ( 1%) . 
Additional Income Available 
for General Corporate 
Purposes · 
Average Year 
1930-1938 
Inclusive 1930-1938 * 
$8,121,965 $9,267,163 
(d) 
1,230,100 
.28:2,277 
2,886,395 
10,000 
1,230,100 
.282,277 
2,886,395 
10,000 
4,408, 772 4,1.-08, 772 
1.84 2.11 
3,713,193 4,858,391 
1,000,000 1,000,000 
721,599 721,599 
2,335,196 2,335,196 
518,932 518,9~2 
862,534 282,664 
* Excl~ding years 1936 and 1938 in which there were 
extraordinary expenses due to floods and hurricane 
damages. 
The above table reveals that if we exclude the 
two years, 1936 and 19)8, in which floods and a hurricane 
caused the railroad great expense, the new fixed charges 
would have been earned 2.l2 times; and if we take the bad 
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years with the good, we find fixed charges were earned 
an average of 1.84 times. Other things being equal, this 
new bond with the above prG forma history, and after be-
coming "seasoned" in the market, it seems should sell at 
par. 
It is, therefore, obvious that . ~hatever the old 
bondholders decided to choose - cash or First Mortgage 
bonds - they would receive the equivalent of cas:tl over a 
period of years. 
The next question to answer is, what are the 
Income bonds worth? An examination of the above table 
reveals that exolading the years 19J6 and 19)8 interest 
was covered on these Income bonds, with $801,596 remain-
ing for the sinking fund and for general corporate pur-
poses. When all years are included, we find a deficiency 
of $34.3,602 in interest coverage. On the basis of this 
calculation, a rough estimate of this bond' a value would 
be between 20 and 50 per oent of par. 
If we now assume that either the cash or mort-
. gage option is the equivalent of $500 and we add to this 
the . 20 per oent of par for the value of the Income bonds, 
we find we have $600 per bond; and if we use the 50 per 
cent figure, we have $750 per bond. The old Mortgage 
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bonds were then selling at around $450 to $500 per bond, 
and this calculation reveals the new securities should be 
worth between $600 and $750. 
The interest on the new Income bonds was to be 
cumulative and in addition to this, in good years, the 
company would retire at least 1 per cent of the original 
amount of the bonds. The plan did not improve the posi-
tion of the stoekholders; in fact it left them in their 
status quo exeept that it increased eontingent charges 
before earnings would be available for dividends. 
The plan, I believe, was very fair and attrac-
tive from both the stockholders' and bondholders' point 
of view. It provided a means for avoiding receivership 
and formulated a definite policy for rehabilitating the 
railroad financially and physically. 
On June 10, 1940, Jesse Jones announced the plan 
was to become operative. There were, however, some 
readjustments in the plan due to the fact that about 
$6,715,000 of the company's old bonds, or less than 6 per 
cent of the total, did not consent to the plan. As a re-
sult, that amount will remain outstanding at least until 
their maturity dates. 
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The following tabulation reveals the effect of 
the plan on the :funded debt as i·t existed on December .31, 
1939 as compared to August 1, 1940: 
General Date .Amount Outstanding Amount Out stand-
Mortgage Due December J1 1 12i9. ins Aus. 11 1940 
-Bonds 
Series Q, .2/2/40 $ 245,000 $ 30,000 
R 5/1/40 .2,6)9 ,ooo 751,000 
s 9/1/40 500,000 82,000 
T 9/1/41 5,841,000 389,000 
u 10/1/41 500,000 
v J/1/42 1,897,000 114,000 
w 4/1/42 1,649,000 12,000 
X 7/1/42 182,000 4,000 
y 11/1/43 958,000 48,000 
z 5/1/43 1,538,000 62,000 
AA 4/1/44 6,097,000 477,000 
BB 4/1/44 170,000 
Funded Debt Maturing 
$22,126,000 $1,969,999 within 5 years -
cc 1/1/45 612,000 29,000 
DD 6/1/45 1,88),;00 82,000 
EE 1/1/46 44?,000 6,000 
FF 1/1/47 801,000 52,000 
GG 4/1/47 375,000 13,000 
AC 9/1/67 30,074,000 2,/+41,000 
II 4/1/55 '14,794,000 1,233,000 
JJ 4/1/61 13,833,000 890,000 
KK 4/1/52 7,500,000 
LL 6/1/62 17 500 000 J . ' . 
MM 4/1/56 3,600,000 
NN 6/1/49 ,.,600,000 
Total General Mortgage 
Bonds Outstanding- $89,8)8,500 $6,715,000 
* Funds were deposited with trustee to pay off these 
bonds and accrued interest after the plan was 
declared operative. 
* 
* 
* 
** 
**Excludes new First Mortgage 4's due 1960 and new General 
Mortgage Income 4~'s due 1970 
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The above table reveals how the plan succeeded 
in advancing maturity dates so that no maturities of any 
large proportions occur before 1960, the year when the 
new First Mortgage 4's of 1960 come due. 
To show the real effect of the plan on the cur-
rent position of the road, the current assets and current 
liabilities are listed below as they were reported to the 
Interstate Commerce Commission on November 30, 1940 and 
1939: 
Current Assets 
Cash 
Loans, drafts and deposits 
Special deposits 
Loans and bills receivable 
Other accounts receivable 
Materials and supplies 
Interest, dividends and 
rent receivable 
Other current assets 
Current Liabilities 
Loans and bills payable 
Traffic and oar service 
balance 
Accounts and wages payable 
Miscellaneous aooounts " 
Interest matured unpaid 
Dividends " " 
Interest and rents aoorued 
u. s. tax liability 
$3, .279,187 
33,000 
232,947 
,208 
3,244,955 
3,066,~22 
19.2,414 
1,626 
$10,050,459 
2,621,364 
5,155,449 
258,469 
104,064 
12,881 
$10,310,.259 
Net working capital (d) ... 259,800 
Funded debt due within 6 months 327,000 
Other tax liability (or) 
Other current liability 
1,594,946 
838,369 
:283,423 
8,11) 
• 4,375,382 
53,000 
678, .<.76 
11,7.33 
2,851,372 
3,207,669 
190,948 
922 
$11,369,302 
16,527,630 
2,080,932 
4,020,825 
258,585 
182,721 
12,972 
1,526,177 
1,228,923 
640,1.22 
3.4~0 $26,282,3 7 
(d) 14,913,075 
4,444,439 
I 
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An examination of the above data reveals that 
the item "Loans and Bills Payable" was reduced in its 
entirety and that the net working capital deficit was 
reduced from almost 15 millions to about a 1/4 million 
deficit - a reduction of about 14-J/4 millionst 
To show the effect of the plan on "times 
charges earned-", to reveal how the plan really operates, 
and to compare the actual figures with those which were 
estimated in evaluating the new securities, I have listed 
below the most current operating data available for the 
entire year of 1940, and also for the six months ending 
December 31, 1940. 
Estimated Earninss for year 
Available for fixed charges 
New fixed charges 
ending December 31, 1940(1) 
$8,046,225 
4,541,184 
Times earned 
Available for contingent charges 
Appropriation for capital fund 
Sinking fund on new First 4's, 1960 
Available1br Income 4~ of 1970 
Interest required 9n Income 4k of 1970 
Times Income 4~ interest earned 
Available for Income 4k Sinking Fund (d) 
Sinking fUnd on Income 4~'s 
1.77 
J, 505,041 
1,000,000 
679,102 
1,825,939 
2,17.2,915 
0.84 
346,976 
482,870 
( 1) Estimate appeared in Poor's ·Financial Records, Daily 
Reports, Railroads (February 4, l941), based on 
actual figures 
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Six Months' Earnings to December 31, 1240 
6 months available for fixed charges 
New fixed charges actual 
Times earned 
Available for contingent charges 
Appropriation for capital fUnd 
Sinking fund new first 4's 
Available for Income 4! bonds 
Interest requirements 4~'s 
$4,602,147 
.., 2,295,467 
2.00 
2,306,680 
500,000 
339,551 
1,1.,67 ~129 
1,086,457. 
Times Income bond interest earned 
Available for sinking fund on Income 4~'s 
Sinking fund on Income 4~'s · 
1 .• 35 
380,672 
241,4.35 
139,237 Available for prior preferred ?% stock 
Equal per share prior preferred stock o.6o 
"ShoWing for Six Months - The $3,505,041 sur-
plus after fixed charges for 1940 is produced after ap-
plication of old fixed charges to June 13 and new fixed 
charges from there on. It is of interest to note that 
the six months - July to December inclusive - produced 
$4,602,147 income available for fixed charges, or twice 
the actual new fixed charges for the period. Also for 
this six months, entire contingent charges for the period 
were earned with a balance of over .$139,237- equal to 
' ! 
$0.60 a share on 229,414 shares of 7 per cent Prior Pre-
ferred stock, on which there is large accumulation or 
unpaid dividends. It might be added th~t only in the 
final month of 1940 did the company begin to experience 
much of a traffic lift as ~ result of all the defense work, 
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gross earnings in that month increasing 8 per cent over 
19J9. Income available for charges for the full year 
1940 was $8,046,:225, or slightly less than in 1939. 
Applying this to estimated new fixed charges on an annual 
basis would show these earned approximately 1.77 times. 
Balance after suoh fixed charges would be sufficient to 
cover capital fund appropriations, sinking fund on new 
1st 4s, and about 84 per cent of full income bond interest 
of 4~ per cent."{l) 
The discussion of the Boston & Maine has covered 
the time before, during, and after the recapitalization 
plan. It has shown why it was necessary to have a recap-
italization plan, how it was proposed and put into opera-
tion, and the effects of the plan on the new securities. 
The only serious criticism of the plan which I have is 
that the RFC did not provide that the company could, if it 
wished, make sinking fund payments on the bonds owned by 
the RFC in bonds instead of in cash. This would have 
allowed the company to purchase the bonds at a discount in 
the open market and credit the difference between par and 
purchase price to surplus. This would have allowed the 
(1) Ibid., p. 4517 
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oompany to increase cash when the bonds were selling 
at a discount or would have facilitated the company 
in increasing the number of bonds retired with a 
given amount of cash. It would also have tended to 
keep the bonds selling closer to par in the open mar-
ket, and thereby help the general credit of the 
company. 
* * * 
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A Recapitalization Plan Which 
Embodies "Questionable" Principles 
In contrast to the Boston & Maine recapitaliza-
tion plan which I believe was very fair to all parties 
concerned, let us now examine a recapitalization plan 
Which embodies unfair and questionable principles. The 
company involved is the Springfield Street Railway, which 
operates street railways and bus lines in the City of 
Springfield, Massachusetts. 
In order that the reader may understand the 
financial condition of the company, the statement of con-
dition as it existed on March 31, 1940 is presented below. 
Springfield Street Railway 
Balano~ Sheet March 31, 1940 
Current Assets 
Cash 
Assets 
Accounts Receivable (net) 
Materials and Supplies 
Interest payment in escrow 
Total Current Assets 
Other Assets 
Operating Property less reserve 
Non-operating property 
Investments 
Special funds 
Deferred Charges 
Total Assets 
• 135,677 
20,545 
62,971 
11.853 
2)1,035 
4,435,070 
5,713 
6,000 
47,318 
6)6,996 
$5, 362,1?2 
Current Liabilities 
Accounts Payable 
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Liabilities 
Accrued Interest, Dividends and 
Rent Payable 
Accrued Taxes 
Other Accruals 
Total Current Liabilities 
Other Liabilities 
* Funded Debt due September 1, 1940 
Deferred Liabilities 
Unadjusted Credits 
Advances Payable to Associate 
Comp!3-11ies 
Common Stock 
Surplus (def) 
Total Li~bilities 
$ 77,566 
6.5,470 
16,357 
12,$75 
172,269 
),077,711 
28,445 
96,478 
830,000 
2,900,000 
1,:742.731 
$5,362,172 
* Represented by $:2, 464,000 Refunding and General 
Mortgage 6's due September 1, 1940; $226,JOO, 
7's due September 1, 1940; $600,000, 6~'s due 
September 1, 1940; and miscellaneous obligations 
to Springfield associates and others. 
It is quite apparent that the company did not 
have funds available to pay off the bonds at maturity, nor 
was its credit such that it could refund the bonds at 
maturity. It was obvious that. the bondholders would have 
to agree to a maturity extension, or the company would be 
forced into receivership. 
The common stock, which is represented on the 
books by $.2, 900, 000, was originally held by the New York, 
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New Haven & Hartford Railroad. This stock was acquired 
at public auction early in the summer of 19J9 by City 
Coach Lines, Inc. in conjunction with Kidder Peabody & 
Company of Boston.{!) The purchase price of this stock 
was $2,900, or approximately the amount of the transfer 
taxes involved.(2) It is, therefore, obvious that this 
stock was in reality worthless. Y.lJt by owning this 
stock, the purchasers were able to control a $5,000,000 
corporation with an investment of less than $3,000. 
Arter the purchasers came into possession of 
this stock, they proceeded to draw up a plan of recapital-
ization for the company. The plan in summary is presented 
below. 
"Plan of Extension, proposed December 26, 1939 -
The plan was proposed by the company to the holders of 
$2,890,300 Refunding and General Mortgage bonds due 
September 1, l940 ($226,)00 "A" 7's, $1,700,000 "B" 6's) 
$434,000 "0" 6's, $200,000 "D" 6£'s, and $330,000 "E" 6's) 
for voluntary approval and is to be consummated upon 
assent by at least 90 per cent of out standing bonds to the 
Agreement of Extension, dated October Jl, 1939. 
(1) Boston New Bureau (October 13, 1939) p. 6 
(2) Obtained from unpublished data of the Public Utilities 
Department of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
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"Treatment of Assenting Bonds - Bonds will be 
registered as to principal and interest and will be 
extended to September 1, 1965 with interest at the rate 
of 3 per cent per annum, plus an additional 3 per cent 
annual income interest, payable only to the extent of net 
income (after fixed interest and after deducting amounts 
charged to operations representing. property no longer re-
quired for corporate purposes, and destroyed, retired 
and sold, and less any deficiencies in income available 
in prior periods)."(l) (Underlining supplied) In other 
words, the amount available for the income interest was 
to be computed after deducting all the charge-ofts of old 
worthless property plus any deficient income or losses 
from prior periods. 
The plan was first presented to the Public Util-
ity Commissioners of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts at 
which time a public hearing was held. On November 27 the 
Commission issued the following bulletin concerning the 
plan: 
State Commission Approves Bond Extension 
The Massachusetts Department ot- .Public Utilities 
handed down an order approving the extension of $2,890,300 
(1) Poor's Public Utiliti Manual (1940) p. 1386 
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company bonds, maturing September 1, 1940; until September 
1, 1965. The present bonds bear interest ranging from 6 
per cent tq 7 per cent. The rate will be reduced to 3 per 
cent per annUm with an additional 3 per cent payable to 
the extent permitted by surplus net income and after pay-
ment into a sinking fund of not more than $150,000 for any 
year. Assent to the Extension Agreement by at least 90 
per cent of the bondholders is essential to make the order 
effective. The order written by Commissioner Webber states 
that it is reasonably clear the company cannot expect to 
raise on its credit, or by refinancing at reasonable terms, 
the amount required to discharge the bonds to become due. 
It was stated at the public hearing that the present man-
agement expects to bring about operating economies through 
gradual substitution of motor busses for trolleys. WUnless 
the plan as subst'antially proposed is accepted by the 
bondholders," Commissioner Webber states, "and approved by 
the necessary authorities, receivership is likely to follow. 
We believe that the primary consideration of the public 
good calls for encouragement and assistance to the petition-
er to solve its financial difficulties in the manner out-
lined in the petition or, at least, to give it a fair trial 
under the scrutiny of the Department. It is also to be 
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understood that no public offering of public utility 
shares is involved in the transaction."(l) 
A casual observation of this plan would prob-
ably result in the following conclusion by an average 
bondholder. , The company does not have sufficient cash 
to pay off the bonds which will soon mature, and they are 
unable to borrow the money to pay them. If the bonds are 
not extended and the interest rate lowered, the company 
will be forced into bankruptcy, and I won't receive any 
interest on my bonds for five or six years, or maybe 
longer. The only logical procedure is to assent to the 
plan and hope that the company will be able to reestablish 
itself, and perhaps some day I can get my money back. 
There were, however, some facts concerning the 
plan of 1 whfch many security holders were unaware. The 
principal fact which was unfair about the plan was that 
income interest was not cumulative and, if the oampany 'was 
unable to earn this interest in -one ,year, it was lost for-
ever. Another fact that tended to .make this provision 
important was that the company was in the process of con-
verting their service from street car to bus service, a_nd 
(1) Appeared in publication by Utility Commissioners of 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (November 27, 1939); 
taken from Poor's Financi,al Records, Utility Cumulat~ 
(July 26, 1939-July 27, 1940), p. 559 
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the management petitioned the Public Utility Commissioner 
for the privilege of charging off these practically 
valueless assets to operations. 
The importance of this request will be realized 
when the amount of these "write-offs" are brought to one's 
attention. The assets to be written off are: 
Street railway 
property 
Trolley cars and 
rail service 
equipment 
Car houses and 
shops, etc •. 
Total 
Asset 
Balance 
$2,759,966 
1,304,358 
240,70]: 
$1+-, 305,026 
Accrued Net 
Depreciation Balance 
$2,759,966 
$491,.510 821,81..8 
59,350 181,351 
$550,360 $3,754,165 
The amount contemplated to be written off is thus 
approximately $3,754,165. On July 26, 1940 the Massachu-
setts Department of Public Utilities approved the requested 
permission to write off a large portion of this. The amount 
to be charged off is to be distributed in equal monthly 
installments over a ten-year period beginning July 1, 1940. 
It is, therefore, obvious that approximately 
$375,000 per year will be charged to operations. This will 
be in the form of actual expenses and will precede income 
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available for income interest. Since the company has 
been only "breaking even", and even losing money in pre-
vious years, it is, therefore, obvious that with $375,000 
increased expenses per year there will be nothing left 
for income interest and, fUrthermore, these charge-offs 
will reduce the coverage of the fixed interest on the 
bonds. This will tend to make them more speculative in 
the eyes of the investing public and, in turn, will tend 
to depress their price in the open market. 
I believe this is a clear case of the interest 
of the bondholder being substituted for the right of the 
residual equity owner, and basically it is unfair and 
unsound. In my opinion the bondholders are being asked 
in reality to pay for depreciated and worthless property. 
This loss should be borne by the equity or common stock 
o~~ers and, as a principle, should always be employed 
and recognized in any recapitalization or reorganization 
plan. 
Two plans of voluntary recapitalization or reor-
ganization have now been discussed. The ri'rst plan was 
very constructive and embodied constructive principles. 
The second plan, as we have seen, contained principles 
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which were not constructive and should be avoided. 
Let us now return to the remainder of the 
borderline railroads which were discussed in the early 
part of the chapter and, by studying each of these 
individually, see if we can arrive at a financial policy 
which, if employed by the various companies, could be 
used to avoid ·receiverships. 
For several years railroad interests exerted 
pressure for Federal legislation which would alleviate 
excessive debt maturities and fixed charges. 
In July, 1939, the Chandler Act was finally ap-
proved by Congress and signed by the President. Tech-
nically, this Act is referred to as Chapter XV - Rail-
road Adjustments, an amendment of the Federal Bankruptcy 
Act approved July 1, 1898. Basically the Act provided a 
means whereby railroads which were pressed with near-
term maturities could, by obtaining the consent of two-
thirds of the securities involved, adjust the interest 
rate and the maturities involved for a limited time. 
The Chandler Act provided that unless it was re-
newed by Congress it was to automatically pass out of 
existence in June of 1940. The Act was not renewed. How-
ever, while the Act was in force, two major railroad 
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systems took advantage of its provisions. These compan-
ies were the Lehigh Valley and the Baltimore & Ohio. A 
discussion of the two companies follows. 
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Lehigh Valley Railroad Oompan;r 
Physically, Lehigh Valley Railroad is one of 
the stronger of the eastern bridge-line systems. 
Practically, all of its main line on the 446 mile route 
from New York to Buffalo is laid with 136-pound rails, 
double tracked, and 98 per cent of ail ties in main 
lines and sidings are cresoted. 
The road covers the Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania 
hard coal regions with a network of lines, and it derives 
about 45 per cent of its tonnage and JO .per cent of its 
freight revenues from that commodity. Widely diversified 
manufactured and miscellaneous products make up another 
30 to 40 per cent of freight revenues. The road has a 
large interchange of traffic with the Pennsylvania and 
other lines, but originates 60 per cent of its freight 
tonnage. Passenger revenues account for less than 6 per 
cent of the total. Pennsylvania Railroad, through its 
subsidiaries, Pennsylvania Company (30 per cent) and 
Wabash (21 per cent) , controls 51 per cent of the Lehigh 
Valley common stook. 
Because of its high physical standards achieved 
early in the depression, Lehigh Valley felt justified in 
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reducing maintenance expenditures quite sharply during · 
the worst years of the depression. Transp_qrtation costs 
are high despite improvements in 1939 and, although 
nearly adequate, Lehigh's locomotive equipment is rela-
tively unserviceable, which suggests that maintenance 
has been deficient and will need to be increased as rev-
enues rise.{l) 
Certain balance sheet and operating data for 
recent years are as follows: 
Available for Times Charges 
~ Funded Debt Fixed Charges Earned 
1929 $89,936,000 $14,815,739 1.99 
1932 95,714,391 4,304,399 .52 
1937 101,601,013 6,313,748 .88 
1938 96,686,034 3,940,982 .55 
1939 96,101,352 7,194,665 .99 
It is quite obvious that the road has accomp-
lished nothing in the last ten years towards reducing 
funded debt. It is, therefore, not surprising after 
examining its record to find that the company took advan-
tage of the Chandler Act in 1939 in order to postpone 
maturities and reduce fixed interest costs. The plan 
provided 75 per cent of the amount of each of the five 
(1) Poor's Industry and Investment Survef of Railroads 
and Holding Companies (June 19, 1940 , P. R2-41 
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semi-annual interest installments on $72,JJ6,000 General 
Consolidated Mortgage bonds due May, 2003, falling due 
November 1, 1938 to November 1, 1940 inclusive, be 
extended without interest for a period of five years 
from their maturity dates. The amount of interest to be 
postponed for five years under this plan amounted to 
$5,844,235. 
The plan also provided for extension, for per-
iods of ten years from their previous maturity dates, of 
the principal amounts of the following bonds: $8,500,000 
Pennsylvania and New York Canal Railroad Company Consoli-
dated Mortgage bonds from April 1, 1939 to April 1, 1949; 
$15,000,000 Lehigh Valley Railway Company First Mortgage 
· bonds from July 1, 1940 tc ~uly 1, 1950; $10,000,000 
Lehigh Valley Terminal Railway Company First Mortgage 
bonds from October 1, 1941 to October 1, 1951. 
Bank and RFC loans totaling $8,648,900 were ex-
tended to November 1, 1943. It is obvious, I believe, 
that no permanent policy was established by the plan by 
which the company could ever hope to reestablish itself 
on a sound financial basis. The plan merely provides for 
the deferrment of interest and maturities and in reality 
"the day of reckoning". 
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If approximately one-half of the debt had been 
substituted by Income bonds and if sinking fund payments 
had been provided before income interest, it would have 
been reasonable to expect that some time in the future 
Lehigh Valley would be a sound railroad financially. As 
it is now capitalized, the author will be greatly sur-
prised if this company is not forced into bankruptcy 
within the next ten years unless Federal aid is granted 
or railroad traffic in general experiences a permanent 
upward growth. 
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Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company 
The Baltimore & Ohio is the third largest of 
the self-contained eastern trunk lines, but it has only 
about one-half the mileage of its two larger competitors. 
For entrance into New York City it depends upon control 
of the Reading and its subsidiary the Jersey Central. In 
addition, the Baltimore & Ohio must depend on branches or 
connections to reach some of the larger central western 
cities served directly by the Pennsylvania and New York 
Central. 
The company occupies a strong position in the 
West Virginia, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Ohio bitumin-
ous coal fields. Bituminous coal furnished 43 per cent 
of freight tonnage and :27.8 per cent of freight revenue 
in 1939. The road is fortunate in that it is not depend-
ent upon anthracite traffic. However, it does depend to 
a large degree upon activity in the heavy industries, par-
ticularly steel. 
The company's $677,154,000 of debt and leased 
line obligations is heavy - equivalent to 69 per cent or 
1939 capitalization, and this amounts to $112,000 per mile 
of track owned and leased.(l) 
( 1) Ibid., P • . R2-22 
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Certain balance sheet and operating data for 
recent years are as follows: 
Fixed Available for Times 
Year Funded Debt Chars;es Fixed Charses Charges 
Earned 
1929 $550,369,000 $28,844,000 $57,612,000 2.-04 
1932 660, ~-69 , 000 ' 34,887,000 . 28,552,000 .81 
1936 656,163,500 '32,893,000 37,432,000 1.14 
19.37 667,512,600 .32,184,000 31,463,000 .98 
1938 670,132,900 '.32, 184' 000 19,060,000 • 59 
1939 665,.561,000 32,184,283* 30,17J,OOO .95 ** 
~ Under the plan of adjustment , fixed charges $20, 421,6 56 
**Under the plan of adjustment, _fixed charges earned 
1.48 times. 
By 1939 the problem of meeting interest ___ and debt 
maturities had become acute. The RFC had advanced 
$87,567,000, and the road had exhausted its collateral re-
sources. Finally $50,000,000 secured 4~ notes and 
$42,100,000 RFC loans came due on August 1, 1939. 
The company secured 88 per cent consent to a five-
year extension of near-term debt maturities and eight-year 
extension of interest maturities upon the junior issues. 
Approved by the courts, the plan reduces fixed interest 
charges $11,376,000 annually, or 38 per cent, until 1947, 
but it leaves this amount contingent upon earnings besides 
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instituting an improvement fund of 2! per cent of gross 
revenues plus sinking funds . The sinking fund charges 
amount to 75 per cent of net income after the above 
charges mentioned, and are to be used for debt retire-
ment, working capital, or capital investment as provided 
in detail by the plan. The above data and discussions 
reveal that the Baltimore & Ohio increased its debt by 
about 115 million from 1929 to 1939, and that maturities 
would .force the road into bankruptcy unless some plan of 
debt modification were provided. This plan will enable 
the company to remain technically solvent until 1947, but 
it does not provide a constructive policy for reduction 
in debt and fixed charges except for the temporary sink-
ing fund. A long-range eonst~ctive financial policy 
would have left about one-half of the former fixed inter-
est bonds on the same basis and would have provided a 
cumulative sinking fund of 1 per cent of the out standing 
debt, allowing the remaining income, if earned, to be 
applied to Income bonds which should have been set up under 
the plan. 
* * * 
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The two previous railroads discussed avoided 
receivership by taking advantage of the Chandler Act. 
The remaining railroads to be discussed are borderline 
companies which failed to earn their fixed charges in 
at least one of the last three years. I am including 
in this group one system - the Illinois Central - which 
did earn its fixed charges in each year but by a very 
small margin. It is an example of a company whose man-
agement, I believe, recognizes the problems of debt and 
is proceeding accordingly. 
* * * 
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Illinois Central Railroad Company 
The Illinois Central system reaches all the way 
~rom the Great Lakes at Chicago to the Gulf at New 
Orleans, and (by a subsidiary) Gulfport. To the westward 
and northwestward, ''stems" reach Minnesota, Iowa, and 
South Dakota, as well as the transcontinental gateways at 
Omaha, Nebraska, and the Twin Cities of Minneapolis and 
st. Paul. On the east, stems branch out to Indianapolis, 
Louisville, and Birmingham. 
Serving the rich Mississippi basis for almost 
its entire length, 'the 16,556 mile system benefits from 
widely diversi~ied traffic. Leading commodities and their 
percentage contribution to freight revenue in 1939 follow: 
bituminous coal 19.4 per cent, ~resh fruits · and vegetables 
S.l per cent, grains and mill products 7.1 per cent, pet-
roleum and its products 5.8 per cent, less than carload 
lots 8.1 per oent, and a wide variety of building mate-
rials 12.5 per cent. Except for bituminous coal, the 
nature of the road's traffic has rendered it particularly 
vulnerable to highway competition. In addition, competi-
tion from government subsidized shipping on the Mississippi 
must be f'aced. 
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Passenger revenues, f@rmer1y exceeding 15 per 
cent of ·total revenues, have declined drastically to less 
than 9 per cent. Although lower fares and such stream-
line units as the "Green Diamond" have recaptured some 
traffic, comm~ter business continues a serious problem.(l) 
Important balance sheet and operating data for 
recent years were as follows: 
. 1929 
1932 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
Gross 
Revenue 
$153,184 
77,745 
98,843 
97,694 
90,937 
96,359 
Funded 
Debt 
Available 
for Fixed 
Charges 
( 000 omitted) 
$366,366 $31,408 
377,508 15,898 
362,341 17' 618 
360,199 19,093 
353,940 17,759 
349,394 18,715 
Fixed 
Charges 
$17,888 
17,058 
16,304 
17,133 
16,645 
16,495 
Times Fixed 
Charges 
Earned 
1.76 
.93 
1.04 
1.11 
1.07 
1.1) 
The above data reveals that the Illinois Central 
was a vulnerable as the average carrier to declining rev-
enues in the depression, and the revenues did not recover 
in 19.36 or 19.37 to even approach 1929 revenue levels. It 
., 
is obvious, however, that the management has been aware 
{1) Ibid., pp. 37-38 
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of the rttndamental weakness in the railroad structure 
and has proce~ded accordingly to reduce thet~ debt. 
Since 1932 ~unded debt 'has been decreased by -about 26 
million. 
The President of the company recently announc-
ed that another sizable reduction in debt had been made 
in the year ending December 31, 1940. The amount retired 
was not revealed, but he stated that since some of the 
company's bonds were selling in the open market at 50 per 
cent of par, the company found it to their advantage to 
buy $2 of debt for $1 when they were able. In that manner, 
twice as much debt can be retired as the amount expended. 
The failure of railroad management to take cog-
nizance of this simple policy has resulted in a great por-
tion of railroad financial difficulty today. 
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Delaware & Hudson Go. 
The Delaware & Hudson Co., a holding company 
since 1930, owns the Delaware & Hudson Railroad Corpora-
tion, the Hudson Goal Company, and outside investments 
having a market value of about $8,839,000 at the 1939 
year-end as compared to a cost of $15,817,000. 
The subsidiary coal company was mortgaged for 
$35,000,000 in 1927, and the proceeds were placed in 
Lehigh Valley & Wabash stocks which were sold to the 
Pennsylvania Railroad a year later at a profit of 
$21,500,000. The bulk of the funds were then placed in 
United States Government bonds and other bonds, only to 
be reinvested in 495,000 shares of New York Central at an 
average price of 22 J/8 late in 1932. This investment 
remains important, although 1937-1938 sales reduced it to 
304,600 shares. Commitments in Hudson Coal bonds, Dela-
ware & Hudson bonds, and numerous common and preferred 
stocks were increased in 1937, but sales were effected 
thereafter to reduce the system's current indebtedness. 
Thus the parent company is increasingly dependent upon its 
subsidiaries. 
The railroad system, the oldest in the country, 
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began as a canal 'company and was designed to distribute 
coal from its associated Pennsylvania anthracite mines -
among the richest in the country. Not until 1909 did it 
accept the functions of a common carrier. The system 
forms a bridge-line between Montreal and New England, 
and between New England and Pennsylvania, with connec-
tions at Schenectady, Albany, and Binghamton, New York, 
with a number of other roads including the Pennsylvania, 
Reading, Lehigh Valley, Erie, and the Boston & Maine. 
For years the road was a high and stable earn-
er, but with changing conditions in the 1920's, accentu-
ated by the depression in the 1930's, earning power of 
the formerly prosperous coal-railroad combination evapor-
ated. In 1939 the road's tonnage was still about 45 per 
cent anthracite, which accounted for 34 per cent of 
freight revenues. The only other itemsof significance 
were bituminous coal, contributing 11 per cent of freight 
revenues, and diversified manufactures supplying over 30 
per cent of revenues. Passenger traffic is nominal. ( 1.) 
Important balance sheet and operating data are 
presented on the following page. 
(1) Poor's Industrial and Investment Survel, Railroads 
and Rail Holding Companies (June 19, 1940) P. R2-29 
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Available Times Fixed 
Gross Funded for Fixed Fixed Charges 
Year Revenue Debt Charges Charges Earned ( 000 omitted) 
1932 $50,566 $90,742 $4,030 $7,007 1.75 
1936 49,365 91,554 8,374 5,9.32 • 71 
19.37 49,.388 84,628 5,470 5,625 1.02 
19)8 40,164 85,192 5,.34.3 5,.3.37 .99 
1939 46,013 88,227 6,991 5,176 • 71 
The above data reveal that this company's gross 
revenue has even declined from its 19.32 level. The main 
reason for this continued decline is that its principal 
product carried, anthracite coal, is a secular declining 
industry. The system should do everything possible to 
reduce its debt and attempt to reestablish itself upon a 
more firm financial basis. 
This company offers ~n example of management 
which is "stock minded". How much better off this com-
pany would be today if the $21,500,000 received from the 
sale of the Lehigh Valley and Wabash stocks would have 
been used for debt reduct ~on instead of an attempt to op-
erate an investment trust t! 
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New York{ Chicago & St. Louis 
_Nickel Plate) 
The Van Swerigen interests took over Nickel 
Plate as a cast-off from the New York Central in 1916, 
and several small properties merged with it in 192) 
forming a highly efficient railroad that has commanded 
an increasing share of traffic and made an outstanding 
record in earnings. As virtually all of the 1,700 road 
miles represent main line, and nearly 75 per cent of 
the freight is received from connections, affiliation 
with other Van Swerigen roads - Chesapeake & Ohio, Pere 
Marquette, and Erie ,- is highly important. In fact merger 
with Chesapeake & Ohio appears a logical eventuality, as 
that road owns 57 per cent of the Nickel Plate common 
stock. 
Extending from St. Louis and Chicago through 
the Great Lakes' industrial regions to Buffalo, with an 
entrance over the controlled Wheeling & Lake Erie and the 
connecting Pittsburgh & West Virginia into the Pittsburgh 
steel district, Nickel Plate occupies a strong traffic 
position. In prosperous years, the automobile industry -
either directly or indirectly - is the road's principal 
customer. In 1939, leading commodities carried, together 
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with their contribution to freight revenues were: 
bituminous coal, 11.8 :per cent; iron, steel, and scrap, 
9.1 per cent; grains and mill products, 7.8 per cent; 
packing house products, 6.9 per cent; fresh meats, 6.3 
per cent; fresh fruita and vegetables, 5.5 per cent; and 
automobiles, .2.1 per cent. Passenger traffic is rela-
tively unimportant.(!) 
Maintenance expenditures were reduced after 
1929 J but physical conditions with respect to both road 
and equipment have continued well above average. The 
operating ratio in 1936, at 6).86, was the lowest ever 
reported - 10 per cent below that or 1929 and 18 per cent 
below that of 1922. 
Important balance sheet and operating data for 
recent years are: 
Gross 
~ Revenue 
Available 
Funded for Fixed 
Debt Charges 
( 000 omitted) 
1929 $56,_385 $1.37,223 $13,.310 
1932 '29,158 163,502 '3,498 
1936 41,7103 159,769 14,SSJ 
1937 41,612 160,192 10,016 
1938 36,381 156,343 6,141 
1939 43,175 155,206 10,464 
( 1) Ibid., P. R2-43 
Fixed 
Charges 
$5,920 
7,908 
7,503 
7,360 
7,200 
7,092 
Times Fixed 
Charges 
Earned 
2.26 
.44 
1.98 
1.36 
.85 
1.48 
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The trend of debt as shown by the above figures 
is a good example of what a corporation should not do. 
From 1929 to 1932 gross revenues declined from $56,385,000 
to $29,158,000, a decline of almost 50 per cent, and dur-
ing the same period debt rose from $137,223,000 to 
$163,502,000. In 1927 we find that the debt was down to 
$109,363,000 and revenues amounted to $5),619,000. 
During 1936, 1937, and 1939 we find the road 
operated at a substantial profit, and yet there was no 
material reduction in debt during this. period. The price 
ranges for the two large bond issues of the company for 
this period were as follows: 
N. Y., Chicago & St. 
Louis Refund. Mortgage 
5k(Series A) due 1974 72-47 
N.Y., Chicago & St. 
Louis Refund. Mortgage 
4~(Series C) due 1974 65-39 
1938 
74-30 105-60 107-82 
62-26 95-53 96-70 
'!'here was no year in the past four in which the 
company could not have bought in some of its bonds at 
some discount, and the disooants did reach 75 per cent in 
the ease of the 4!'s in l9J8. Unless a material reduction 
in debt is established before the next serious depression, 
it will be quite likely that this road will find itself 
using Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Aot to reduce its debt. 
-111-
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. 
The Atlantio Coast Line serves the south 
Atlantic Seaboard. Its lines extend from Riobmond to the 
tip of Florida with branches and oonneoting lines in the 
Carolinas and Florida. 
Products of agriculture and manufacturing con-
stitute most of the company's freight traffic. Since the 
former requires prompt delivery during the winter months, 
the company's business is highly seasonal, over 60 per 
cent of net railway operating inoome acoruing in the 
first four months of the year. Leading products carried 
and their contribution to 1939 freight revenues were: 
agrioultural products )1.2 per cent, animals 2. 5 per oent, 
mining products 13.5 per cent, forestry products 14.1 per 
cent, L.C.L. 11.1 per cent. Less than carload traffic is 
somewhat heavier than for the average road, which renders 
the company vulnerable to highway competition, while com-
petition with coastal shipping continues despite recur-
rent rate reductions since 1933. 
Passenger traffic has always been important to 
the company, being an important factor in its prosperity 
during the Florida boom days. It has suffered acutely 
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from automobile competition, and although passenger bus-
iness supplied nearly 14 per cent of total revenues in 
1939, there is little prospect that it will contribute 
much to net earnings despite increasing vacation travel 
and new equipment.(!) 
One of the roads principal assets is a 51 per 
cent interest in the consistently profitable profitable 
bittiminous coal carrier - Louisville & Nashville. 
Important financial and operating data for re-
cent years are: 
Available 
Gross 
Year Revenue 
-
Funded for Fixed Fixed Times 
Debt Charges Charges Earned 
Divi-
dends 
Paid 
-( ooo omitted) 
1929 $.72,.372 $157,270 $18,68) $6,761 
193~ 63,020 156,206 12,998 
19.31 54,088 155,142 8,704 
1932 37,269 154,078 73 
1933 37,909 152,357 4,30J 
1934 39,534 144,792 6,053 
1935 39,033 150,228 4,060 
19.36 43' 593 149' 589 8' 405 
19.37 47,972 153,150 8,911 
1938 44,164 . 151,145 4,592 
1939 47,099 144,787 7,173 
6,743 
6,683 
6,759 
6,689 
6,548 
6,589 
6,490 
6,457 
6,451 
6,369 
2.56 $8,234 
1.82 8,234 
1.27 4,529 
.01 
.64 
.92 
.62 
1 • .30 866 
1.)8 1,275 
.71 
1.13 
(1) General comment from Poor's Investment SurveA, {June 19, 
1940) , P. R2-22; traffic statistics from Moo · y' s Rail-
road Manuel (1940) p. 149 
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We find that gross revenues declined from 
$72,372,000 in 1929 to $37,269,000 in 1932, and no real 
recovery occurred in revenues until 19)6. Fixed charges 
were not tully covered after 1931 until 1936, and in that 
year we find the margin was only 130 per cent. In 1936 
we also tind the company paid dividends of $866,000. In 
other words, after experiencing deficits for tour straight 
years the management had the courage to declare a divi-
dend in the first year that profits accrued. The dividend 
in the following year was increased by 50 per cent, and 
we find also in that year, 1937, funded debt increased by 
over 3 millions. 
The price range of the company's bonds tor re-
cent years was as follows: 
1st 4's, 1952 89-72 94-69 105-85 106-95 103-90 -
Unified 4! Series A 
due 1964 71-54 77-53 99-73 100-76 92-71 
This table of price ranges reveals that one 
issue of the company never sold above par since 1935, and 
it sold as low as 53 per cent of par, and yet the manage-
ment failed to use its funds to buy any of these bonds; 
instead it used $2,141,000 to pay dividends. This, I be-
lieve is a flagrant example of financial mismanagement~ 
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The Delaware, Lackawanna & 
Western Railroad Companx 
The Lackawanna possesses several strategic 
advantages, such as affiliation with some of the best 
anthracite mines in Pennsylvania (Glen Alden), and the 
shortest and double-tracked route trom New York to 
Buffalo. The 1,000-mile system serves the highly in-
dustrialized and thickly populated states of New York, 
New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. 
Anthracite coal has always been Lackawanna's 
most important freight revenue producer, although a 
large portion of such tonnage has been lost as a result 
of the industry's declining competitive position as well 
as "bootlegging" in recent years. In 1939, however, 
anthracite still supplied over 33 per cent of freight 
tonnage and 29 per cent of freight revenues. Next in 
importance are a wide variety of manufactured goods, 
iron and steel, automobiles, and cement. Passenger 
traffic, largely of the commuting type, is important to 
Lackawanna, contributing 13 per cent of 1939 revenues, 
but holds little promise of increasing substantially or 
even becoming profitable. 
The company does not appear to have neglected 
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maintenance seriously, as equipment is adequate and in 
better-than-average condition, while nearly 77 per cent 
of the 1,658 miles of main track is laid with 101-pound 
or heavier rail. 
The c.ompany has almost no direct debt, but guar-
antees outstanding stocks and bonds of leased lines. 
Total of leased lines and parent company capitalization 
and parent company funded debt was $139,957,000 at the 
1939 year-end, and this represents $144,000 on each mile 
of the owned and leased lines.(l) 
Important financial and operating data for re-
cent years are: 
Gross 
Year Revenue 
-
1929 $81,743 
19)3 43,339 
1937 50,175 
1938 44,188 
1939 50,454 
Available 
Funded f~r ' Fixed Fixed 
Debt Charges Charges 
(000 omitted) 
$ 9J t20,517 $7,177 
15 5,449 8,843 
6,847 7,783 
3,677 3, 7.27 7,682 
3,287 7,303 7,812 
Times Fixed 
Charges 
Earned 
2.86 
.65 
.88 
.49 
.9) 
The Lackawanna is a good exwnple of a railroad 
depending upon an industry which is in a secular decline. 
This is the anthracite coal industry. 
(1) Ibid., P. R2-28 
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The great majority of Lackawanna's fixed 
charges is in the .form, of guarantees on stocks and bonds. 
I 
The problem of guaranteed securities is very complex. 
Simply stated, however, when a railroad desires to oper-
ate and use a railway line which it does not own, it can 
either buy the line, lease it, or effect a merger with 
the company which owns it. Business activity is usually 
at a good level when these expansion programs are effect-
ed, and consequently any lease arrangement is predicated 
upon high rental fees for long periods of time. When 
business activity decreases, many of these formerly highly 
profitable leased lines become a burden to the guarantor. 
This, in simple terms, is the case of the Lackawanna. 
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Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Companz 
This railroad is at a disadvantage in its 
territory, as it competes with the larger transcontinen-
tal railroads, and it is relatively more dependent upon 
petroleum traffic. Operating mileage - J,JOO miles - is 
relatively small. Although the company commands the 
shortest route from Kansas City to Texas with lines ex-
tending to the Gulf at Galveston, its St. Louis lines 
hold no strategic advantages. Traffic density is thin 
on most of its mileage and, while the territory served 
has shown economic development during the last :25 years, 
the company has shown comparatively small permanent gains. 
For example, it enjoyed, a large increase in crude and 
refined oil traffic in the 1920's, but during the 1930's 
it suffered heavy losses to pipe lines and motor trucks. 
Since 1938, Illinois oil production has complicated the 
position of mid-continental refiners on the company's 
lines. 
Petroleum products continue to be the main source 
of freight revenues, while products of agriculture are also 
important. Yet here again, much wheat and cotton traffic 
has been lost as the result of world economic changes 
undermining America's export markets. Meanwhile, highway 
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competition has increased to take much of the remaining 
high-rate agricultural traffic. 
During the 1930-1935 period, maintenance ex-
penditures were sharply reduced, and over one-half of 
the road's rolling stock was retired as obsolete. Al-
though maintenance work was increased thereafter and new 
equipment added in 1937, a fair portion of any increase 
in gross revenue will probably be needed for maintenance 
work. ( 1) 
Important financial and operating data for re-
cent years are: 
Available Times Fixed 
Gross Funded for Fixed Fixed Charges 
Year Revenue Debt Charses Charges Earned 
(000 omitted) 
1929 $56,024 $93,214 $13,6.30 $5,104 2.67 
1932 :27,240 93,094 4,258 4,890 .87 
1936 .31,308 93,094 4,773 4,911 1.13 
1937 32,120 93,093 J,274 4,899 .78 
1938 27,858 9J,09J 1,120 4,969 .26 
1939 .28,171 9),093 1, 570 5,070 .36 
The changing over to pipe lines from tank oars 
for crude oil transportation, and the dust storms des-
(1) Ibid., P. R2-41 
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troying much of the road's normal agricultural traffic, 
has meant near financial disaster for this railroad. 
However, a glance at the funded debt statistics reveals 
that no material reduction in this item has occurred 
since 1929, although profitable operations continued 
until 1932. It is obvious that a material reduction in 
debt and fixed charges must be accomplished soon or the 
road will be in bankruptcy. 
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The Long Island Railroad Companz 
(controlled by the Pennsylvania 
Railroad Company) 
From time to time additional properties were 
acqui.r .('d ,by th,e oompany, and it now controls and operates 
• ;> :., 
, nearly all the steam railroads on Long Island. Proper-
ties of the Long Island Railroad Company and the North 
Shore branch were merged on June 23, 1921. 
The company own important freight terminals, 
chiefly at Bay Ridge on Lower New York Bay, and terminal 
facilities and yards in Long Island City adjacent to the 
East River near 34th Street. 
The company operated )8.2 miles of track in 1939, 
owned 128 locomotives, and 1,388 passenger cars, as com-
pared to 315 freight cars. Freight revenue amounted to 
27 per cent of total revenues in 1939. All of the freight 
oars owned by the company were purchased prior to 1923. 
Of the passenger oars, 915 were purchased prior to 1923 or 
nearly 70 per cent were over 17 years old. 
Maintenance of way and structure was drastically 
curtailed from 1930 to 1933, being reduced from $5,862 per 
mile of track to $.2, 218. These were later increased some-
what, and in 1939, $3,435 was expended per mile.(l) 
(1} Ibid., P. R2-45 
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Important financial and operating data for re-
cent years are: 
Available 'rimes Fixed 
Gross Funded for Fixed Fixed Charges 
Year Revenue Debt Char~es Chars;es Earned 
1929 $41,326 ( ooi omitted) $48,861 9,24~ $2,888 2.95 
1932 '28, 220 42,537 5,172 2,173 2.15 
1936 25,525 39,801 928 2,086 .44 
1937 :24,586 43,951 180 2,295 .08 
1938 .23, 308 40,.)51 (d) 55 2,154 (d) .o; 
1939 25,558 40,351 469 2,207 .21 
The above data reveal that in the early part of 
the depression coverage of fixed charges remained rela-
tively stable, although gross revenue declined over 
$13,000,000. This, in part, can be explained by the above 
statement as to reduced maintenance and also by the mate-
rial reduction in debt. 
Data as to income available for charges in recent 
years reveal a persistent decline, and it appears from the 
above statistics there should be no debt outstanding at all. 
A drastic revision in the capitalization of this railroad 
would be an absolute necessity if the bonds of the company 
were not endorsed and guaranteed by the Pennsylvania Rail-
road Company, of which the company is a subsidiary. As it 
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now is situated, the Lond Island is a definite liability 
to its parent company, and there is probably no recourse 
to the Pennsylvania except to pay off the bonds at 
maturity. 
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Southern B~cific Co. 
The Southern Pacific Co. operates either 
directly or indirectly 16,000 miles of track which com-
prises one of the largest railroad systems in the United 
States. The system extends .from New Orleans across the 
"Sunset" continental route to Los Angeles, then up the 
Pacific Coast to Portland, Oregon. It has a commanding 
traffic position in Texas, Southern Louisiana, and it 
dominates most of California. Additionally, its lines 
extend from San Francisco to Ogden, Utah, the latter 
forming the western link of the Union Pacific "Overland 
Route". The Southern Pacific controls the st. Louis and 
Southwestern which it purchased in 1930, and thereby 
affords it access to the Mississippi gateways of Memphis 
and St. Louis. Controlled steamships ply between the 
Atlantic and Gulf ports. 
Agricultural products represented by fruits 
and vegetables, such as oranges, grapefruit, grapes, 
melons, and sugar beets account for roughly 20 per cent 
of the tonnage and 30 per cent of revenues. Other impor-
tant commodities include lumber, copper, and gravel and 
sand, petroleum products, cement, automobile accessories, 
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and numerous ores. Passenger traffic, even though far 
below the level of prior years represents about 12 per 
cent of gross revenue. 
The main lines of this system meet satisfactory 
physical standards, since nearly 54 per cent of such 
mileage is laid with 110-pound or heavier rail, and prac-
tically all the remainder with 90-pound rail. Equipment 
is well below the average age and in better than average 
repair. ( 1) 
Important financial and operating data for re-
cent years are: 
Available Times Fixed 
Year Gross Funded for F.ixed Fixed Charges 
Revenue Debt Charges Charses Earned 
( 000 omitted) 
1929 $310,969 $744,643 $77,714 $30,178 2.')7 
1930 2')8,759 784,6T3 61,954 31,270 1.98 
1931 198,642 827,065 39,277 32,138 1.22 
1932 142,597 821,584 .26 ,2.40 32,018 0.82 
19.33 129,861 831,734 25,891 30,882 0.84 
1934 149,193 690,450 35,037 31,006 l.lJ 
1935 163,360 683,241 34,376 30' 579 1.1'2 
1936 204,339 711,664 45,5:25 ·3o, 577 1.49 
1937 :225,017 700,728 33~187 30;703 1•08 
1938 .200,071 699,880 24,191 30' 720 0.79 
1939 217,573 705,844 36,142 J0,007 1.20 
{ 1) Ibid., P. R2-49 
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The above table reveals there was a steady 
decline in gross revenues from 311 millions in 1929 to 
129 millions in 1933. Funded debt during this period, 
however, increased from 745 millions to 832 millions, 
while the amount available for fixed charges declined 
from 78 millions to 26 millions. A noticeable improve-
ment has occurred since that period in both debt · and 
revenues. It should be apparent to the management that 
all net income in the next few years should be directed 
towards debt reduction. Dividends should not be con-
sidered until the debt is reduced at least to 500 millions 
and fixed charges to :20 millions. 
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New York Central 
New York Central's 11,000 miles of main line 
rank it first in the eastern trunk line territory. The 
road, however, has little mileage in the State of 
Pennsylvania except for the Pittsburgh district, and it 
does not reach the middle Atlantic Seaboard south of 
New York City. 
New York Central dominates New York State and 
is strongly entrenched in the Great Lakes region. It 
also has a direct entrance into New England through the 
Boston & Albany. The company has the advantage of low 
grades over a large portion of its lines, since it follows 
the Hudson River Valley to Buffalo and the Great Lakes' 
shores most of the way to Chicago. Rail and roadbed 
standards are far above the average, though hardly com-
parable to those of the Pennsylvania. 
Freight revenues are composed largely of the 
heavy industry type. 'fhe most important commodities hauled 
and their portion of 1939 freight revenues are as follows: 
bituminous coal 22.8 per cent, iron and steel (including 
scrap) 8.1 per cent, automobiles and accessories 5.7 per 
cent, building materials 6.7 per cent, and LCL 6.1 per cent. 
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Passenger traffic still represents 18 per cent 
of gross revenue, but has declined drastically since 1929 
despite new equipment, shortened time schedules, and wide 
reductions in rates (the 2-cent rate per mile was reestab-
lished in March of 1940 for the World's Fair and these 
cuts continue). 
New York Central sharply reduced its maintenance 
expenditures during the depression, both in total amount 
and in its ratio to gross revenue. 
reduction in depreciation charges. 
It also made a large 
This, on the whole, 
indicates deferred needs although no worthy progress has 
been made in repairing equipment sinoe 1936. Roadways are 
in good condition. About 80 per cent of the 14,249 miles 
of main traok is laid with 100-pound or heavier rail. The 
number of unserviceable locomotives is relatively small.(l) 
(l) Ibid., P. R2-45 
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Important financial and operating data for re-
cent years are: 
Available Times Fixed 
Gross Funded for Fixed Fixed Charges 
Year Revenue Debt Charses Charses Earned 
( 000 omitted) 
1929 $590,008 $663,886 $134,156 $56,727 2.36 
1933 283 ')41 , ./ 671,151 52,957 58,369 .90 
1935 310,193 642,982 58,~.86 58,371 1.00 
1936 361,064 68.2,823 66,075 57,142 1.18 
1937 366,226 695, S5.2 58,550 52,197 1.14 
1938 298,681 690,611 ·29,076 49,:2:31 0.55 
19:39 341,087 685 J 780 52,613 48,103 1.10 
The New York Central comprises one of the 
country's largest and most essential railroads. The 
above data reveal, however, that is is definitely a border-
line road. The company has approximately 65 millions of 
debt maturing within the next four years. This should be 
retired by all means and not refunded or reissued under 
any circumstances. 
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Pere Mar_g_uett-e Ra-ilroad Company 
The Pere Marquette serves Buffalo, Detroit, and 
the lower Michigan penninsula, and is primarily dependent 
upon activity in the automobile and related industries. 
Leading commodites carried, together with their contribu-
tions to 1939 freight ·revenue were: bituminous coal 14.J 
per cent, automobiles and tires 10 .'2 per cent; iron, steel, 
and scrap 9.6 per cent, petroleum products 6.5 per cent, 
and grain and flour 4.6 per cent. There is also a large 
volume of miscellaneous manufactured commodities. A luc-
rative traffic in crude petroleum was secured in the early 
recovery years, and after declining in 1936 to 1938, rose 
sharply in 1939. Passenger revenue is no~nal - about J 
per cent of 1939 revenue. 
The Pere Marquette is controlled by the Chesa-
peake & Ohio, and possesses valuable traffic connections 
which supply nearly 62 per cent of total freight tonnage. 
In this connection, interests controlling the Chesapeake 
& Ohio are endeavoring to merge Pere Marquette, Chesa-
peake & Ohio, and Nickel Plate. However, collapse in 
railroad earning power has delayed these developments. 
Since 1928 Pere Marquette's properties have been 
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notably improved. The 1,115 miles of first main line 
track are laid, 88 per cent, with 90-pound or heavier · 
rail, and the equipment is in good condition indicating 
little deferred maintenance and reflecting efficient 
operation. Equipment rental expense continues to be sub-
stantial, thus indicating the possible need for more 
equipment. ( 1) 
Important financial and operating data for re-
cent .years are: 
Gross 
~ ~R.-.ev.-e;;.;;;n_u .... e
1929 $48,46·8 
1930 27,216 
1931 :27' J45 
1932 21,461 
1936 32,459 
1937 32,229 
19J8 25,445 
1939 30,233 
Available 
Funded for Fixed Fixed 
Debt Charges Charges 
( 000 omitted) 
$42,955 $10,151 $2,677 
56,955 5,102 3,087 
64,955 1,891 3,754 
64,872 80J 3,848 
64,535 6,098 J,340 
64,535 5,00.2 ! 3,332 
64,5J5 1,090 J,J50 
64,5:35 3,636 . 3,308 
Times Fixed Divi-
Charges dends 
Earned Paid 
3.79 
1.65 
0.50 
0.21 
1.8J 
1.50 
O.JJ 
1.10 
$4,784 
4,784 
1,561 
2,240 
1,260 
The above data reveal how the Van Swerigen inter-
ests tried to keep their properties paying dividends and 
(1) Ibid., P. R2-48 
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how they almost forced this one into bankruptcy. Instead 
of deferring dividend payments in 1930 and 1931, as a con-
servative management would have done, in 1930 the company 
issued $21,000,000 4~ bonds due in 1980, a maturity date 
50 years in the future! A portion of this issue was, how-
ever, for refunding purposes. The data also reveal that 
management considered debt as a permanent thing and not 
something to be paid off as soon as possible. 
After lasing money in the years 1931 through 
1934, we find the company paying 3.5 millions in dividends 
in the years 1936 and 1937. 
An examination reveals the following price range 
of the company's largest bond issue -the First Mortgage 
5%, Series A due 1956: 
!.2.l2~illl~.!.W.ill.41ill~ 
68-52 75-49 101-69 101-89 88-69 78-50 63-28 57-28 
How much better financially this company would 
have been if it had conserved its cash and retired a good 
portion or its debt in the depression years. 
-132-
Northern Pacific Railway Co. 
Northern Pacific, like Great Northern, extends 
from Duluth and other Great Lakes' ports to the Pacific 
Coast, except that it follows a more southerly and more 
mountainous route; also it serves a larger expanse of 
lumbering and farming territory, and a much smaller sec-
tion of the iron ore region. Hence, emphasis is on agri-
cultural products and lumber rather than iron ore traffic. 
The more important commodities and their contributions to 
1939 freight traffic were: lumber 16.7 per cent, Wheat 
and flour 14.5 per cent, fresh fruits and vegetables 7.8 
per cent, petroleum and its products 7.3 per cent, bitum-
inous coal 6.1 per cent, and livestock and packing house 
products 3.7 per cent. Passenger revenue represented 
less than 6 per cent of total gross in 1939, whereas it 
exceeded 13 per cent in the middle 20's. 
Control of the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy 
Railroad is owned jointly with Great Northern, as is also 
the control of Spokane, Portland & Seattle and various 
terminal properties. Through the 100 per cent owned 
Northwest Improvement Company, Northern Pacific has large 
land holdings and extensive coal deposits. From the lat-
ter it draws a substantial portion of its own fuel supplies. 
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Valuable coal lands are also directly owned. 
Better than 53 per oent of the 2,823 miles of 
main line track are laid with 100-pound or heavier rail, 
and practically all the remainder with 90-pound. The 
1936-1937 equipment program involved the purchase of 29 
locomotives and J,OOO freight cars, as well as the repair 
of the bulk of unserviceable units, vastly improving what 
was in 1935 a relatively poor situation. Early in 1940 
the road received another 2,000 freight cars.(l) 
Important financial and operating data for re-
cent years are: 
1929 
1932 
Gross 
Revenue 
$95,522 
47,084 
1936' 61,906 
1937 64,851 
19:38 57,022 
19J9 6),882 
Available 
Funded For Fixed 
Debt Charges 
( 000 omitted) 
$332,600 $36,472 
J28, 771 12,330 
329,299 16,137 
335,210 14,5.29 
333,939 10,321 
332,740 14,569 
(1) !bid., P. R2-47 
Fixed 
Charges 
$14,664 
14,321 
14,320 
14,412 
14,643 
14,495 
Times Fixed 
Charges 
Earned 
2.49 
.86 
1.13 
1.01 
0.70 
1.01 
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Northern Pacific presents an example of a rail-
road company which failed to earn a satisfactory return 
in the depression years. To offset this loss, the company 
"milked" its two principal subsidiaries - Northwest Im-
provement Company and Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Rail-
road Company. It now finds itself divested of this 
additional revenue, especially in the case of the North-
west Improvement Company. The company has not reduced its 
debt since 1929, and in 1939 we find fixed charges covered 
1.01 times compared to 2.49 times in 1929. 
Future gains in revenue should by all means be 
used to reduce its debt which in 19.39 amounted to $5.20 per 
dollar of revenue. 
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Southern Railway Companz 
Its slogan - "The Southern Serves the South" -
describes fairly the Southern Railway Company. Its 6,600 
miles of track spread over a wide territory south of the 
Mason-Dixon Line and east of the Mississippi River. Some 
of the more important cities reached are Washington, 
Richmond, Norfolk, Jacksonville, New Orleans, Memphis, 
St. Louis, Cincinnati, Atlanta, and Birmingham. The 
road's territory is still mainly agricultural. Cotton, 
tobacco, and fresh fruits and vegetables influence the 
region's welfare. However, the bulk of Southern's traf-
fic is of an industrial character, bituminous coal being 
its largest single revenue producer, while automobile ac-
cessories, fertilizer~ lumber, and petroleum products are 
important • . L.C~L. freight is heavy, which leaves Southern 
quite vulnerable to highway competition. The once large 
passenger traffic has declined sharply, but it still rep-
resents approximately 9 per cent of gross revenue. 
Southern's physical condition, despite the large 
amounts spent for rehabilitation and new equipment in the 
1920's leaves much to be desired. Only 28.5 per cent of 
first main line track is laid with 100-pound or heavier 
I 
' 
,J j 
i 
I 
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rail. Since 1929 equipment has been inadequate, with eon-
sequent heavy rental expense. This .situation has been 
improved somewhat since 1938 by the purchase of 8,188 new 
freight cars with the aid of RFC funds.(l) 
Gross 
Year Revenue 
Available 
Funded for Fixed Fixed 
Debt Charges Charges 
Times Fixed Divi-
Charges dends 
Earned Paid 
( 000 omitted) 
19.29$143,184$298,5.22$,32,864 #14,508 
1930 118,869 294,494 23,826 14,473 
1931 97,715 290,465 8,588 14,285 
2.02 $13,386 
1.51 13,386 
0.66 454 
193-2 72,987 301,188 3,513 14,505 0.36 
1933 76,148 296,701 16,527 17,488 0.95 
1934 78,184 291,877 14,038 17,059 0.82 
1935 82,885 287,779 15,283 17,032 0.90 
1936 96,274 284,419 .21,150 _16,845 1.26 
1937 98,4-35 279,405 17,333 16,527 1.05 
1938 89,4-19 290,318 16,072 16,570 0.97 
1939 99,454 292,600 .23,376 16,908 1.38 
Southern Railway experienced a 50 per oent reduo-
' 
tion in revenues from 1929 to 1932 while funded debt 
increased by 3 million. The reader may question the increase 
in fixed charges while the debt has remained constant. The 
{1) Ibid., P. R2-50 
-
-137-
answer to this question is presented in the above discus-
sion of the company's inadequate equipment. Since rental 
of requipment is considered to be a fixed charge, we find 
this company's fixed charges increasing by about J ·million 
with no corresponding increase in debt. 
There have been other cases which were previous-
ly discussed where this was true, but I have neglected to 
point out the situation, because it was not nearly as 
important as in this case. 
If fixed charges of the Southern had remained at 
their 1929 level when debt was even higher than in 1939, 
fixed charges would have been earned 1.61 times instead of 
l.J8 times. 
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The discussion in this chapter first dealt with 
the country's forty largest railroads. We found that 
only 13 of these were able to earn their fixed charges in 
each of the past three years. Of the remaining 27 we 
found that 1.2 were in bankruptcy or trusteeship. The re-
maining 15 were examined objectively for the purpose of 
.formulating a financial policy which it is hoped can be 
applied in general to all railroads which are financially 
handicapped. 
The first of these railroads studied, the Boston 
& Maine, has already consummated a recapitalization plan 
which the author believes will serve to reconstruct the 
company's finances upon a sound basis in years to come. 
The next company studied, the Springfield Street 
Railway, is attempting to complete a recapitalization plan 
which will probably reestablish the company on a sound 
financial basis, but the previous discussion has pointed 
out that this will be accomplished at the expense of the 
bondholders rather than the stockholders who rightfully 
should bear this burden. 
The next two railroads discussed - the Baltimore 
& Ohio and the Lehigh Valley - have sought refuge in the 
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Chandler Act. These two companies have succeeded in 
postponing the "day of reckoning" for their bond maturi-
ties, but t~ey have not established a firm constructive 
policy for reducing their debt in line with reduced 
revenues. 
The remainder of the companies were examined 
with the thought in mind that something was definitely 
wrong with their financial structure, the industries upon 
which they were dependent, or other factors. The purpose 
of the discussion was to ascertain which of these factors 
was the cause of the inherent weakness that has seemed to 
have developed in railroad securities over the past decade. 
From the discussion of the borderline cases, I 
believe it is possible to summarize the causes of these 
railroads' financial unsoundness as follows: 
1. The greatest single primary cause has, of 
course, been declining revenues in such proportion that 
the company was unable to maintain its profit margins. 
2. The second most important factor has been 
the undue concentration of funded debt tn the capital struc-
tures. During the decade of 1920-1930, revenues were large 
enough to "service" this debt with adequate margins. The 
fallacy here was that the railroad managements directed too 
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much of this margin to the payment of dividends and too 
little for debt retirement. Then; too, in the early 
stages of the Great Depression, it was not apparent to 
most railroad managements how intense and severe was' to 
be the depression nor how adversely the railroads were 
to be affected. Consequently, many railroads paid divi-
dends which were not earned and thereby made themselves 
vulnerable to depressions through depletion of cash and 
failure to retire debt • 
.3• The third factor whieh varies in importance 
as between railroads is the increase in rental expense. 
This item, in reality, is a fixed charge, and an increase 
in rental expense automatically decreases the coverage of 
fixed charges. Southern Railway was the only railroad 
where we stressed the importance of equipment rentals. 
This condition has existed and still exists with many 
other railroads, however. When traffic is originated on 
one road and thep given to other roads later oa for fUr-
ther hauling, the equipment involved is also passed on. 
The Interstate Commerce Commission allows the road owning 
the equipment to charge $1 per day per oar. If, however, 
a road has inadequate equipment, it will borrow other 
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railroads' equipment for long periods, and the conse~ 
quental rental expense is sometimes very substantial. 
These charges should be capitalized as an equivalent 
amount of debt whenever the company involved is analyzed 
or appraised, because they must be considered as fixed 
charges. 
In final summary we may then say the chief 
causes of railroad maladies are: declining revenues, 
disproportionately large debt, and inadequate equipment. 
We have now found the chief causes of today's 
railroad problems. The solution to these problems is 
fairly simple, but the carrying out of the policies to 
be advised will not be easy. The main subject of the 
next and final chapter will be this proposed theoretical 
financial policy. 
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CH.APrER IV 
The first section of this paper was devoted to 
an examination of our economic structure. We found by 
various comparisons that real prosperity does not develop 
unless there is also a relatively high degree of prosper-
ity in the durable or capital goods industry. We also 
found that activity in the durable goods industry tended 
to fluctuate much more violently than did the consumers 
goods industry or industry as a whole. 
A comparison was then made of railroad purchas-
ing and the business cycle, and between railroad purchas-
ing and spending and its relative importance to the 
capital goods industry. We found there was a high degree 
of correlation between railroad purchasing and the busi-
ness cycle, although the various authors cited refused to 
estimate the degree or amount of causal relationship exist-
ing. 
We also found that railroad spending for new 
equipment and maintenance of way and structure had declined 
tremendously in the 1930's as compared to the 1920's. Var-
ious estimates of authorities were cited as to the accumu-
lated needs of the railroads, but since we no longer have 
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an accurate or even an approximate base year upon which 
to predicate our estimates, we could only say that if 
prosperity returned to the country and the railroads 
were required to haul even a relatively large portion 
of that hauled in the 1920's, existing facilities were 
grossly inadequate. 
The next step in our study involved the anal-
ysis of railway operations and capitalization to deter-
mine if the railroads were financially prepared to make 
these commitments if they were so required. 
In this analysis we examined the capitalization 
and operating experience of American railroads from 1890 
through 1938. This analysis revealed that since 1910 no 
appreciable reduction has resulted in the percentage of 
capitalization represented by funded debt, but there was 
a sharp increase in the operating ratio following 1914, 
and the ratio never returned to the favorable level which 
existed prior to this time. This, I believe, is probably 
contrary to the popular conception as to railroad pros-
perity in the 1920's. 
By comparing the capitalization of railroads to 
public utilities and industrial corporations in 1931, we 
found that the industrial concerns were the most oonserva-
tive in their capitalization, public utilities were second, 
and the railroads were the least conservatively capital-
ized. Yet when we compared oarloadings to our general 
business index, we found that the railroads were as much 
or even more vulnerable to depressions from the standpoint 
of physical volume of business than business as a whole. 
This simple fact proved to be the rude awakening to the 
holders of railroad securities since 1930. 
The entire analysis to this point has been 
directed towards railroads and their problems. In line 
with our findings on the excessive debt structure of rail-
roads, possibly it might be well to turn our attention for 
a moment to public utilities and see what experts have to 
say about their debt structure. 
"Too many utilities regard their debt as 
perpetual and make no adequate provision 
for its ultimate liquidation. In this 
connection it is noteworthy that as a 
result of numerous recent refundings, it 
is estimated that some $.3,656,200,000of 
debt (or well over one-half of the total 
fixed debt of the utility industry) falls 
due in the decade from 1961 to 1970. 
Moreover, it is estimated that $2,54.3,600,000 
or funded debt (or aLmost 40 per cent of 
the total) falls due in the five years from 
1965 to 1969. Experts have suggested that 
this may constitute an undue concentration 
of maturities and a possible future source 
of trouble. There also appears to be an 
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abiding faith in the permanency of 
existing generation and transmission 
facilities although it is well known 
that rapid scientific progress might 
change the methods of the power 
industry overnight." (1) 
A similar optimism once prevailed in the street 
railway industry: "As late as 1921 an investment banker 
wrote -
'Sinking funds are found in some of the 
.earlier street railway mortgages, but 
the present tendency is to omit them, 
on the theory that a street railway is 
permanent property and not of a wasting 
character where sinking funds are essen-
tial to reduce the debt as the assets 
are diminished.'" ' (2) 
History has proven the fallacy of this argument 
as to street railways; yet we find many utility men argu-
ing with the same line of reasoning as was used by the 
above-mentioned investment banker some twenty years ago. 
The remainder of the quotation follows: 
"In addition to the danger arising out of the 
fixed maturities of excessive debt, the strain caused by 
heavy fixed charges in lean years will be detrimental to 
services furnished to the public. Again with respect to 
the railroads, the Interstate Commerce Commission has said: 
(1) See address by Floyd L. Carlisle delivered before the 
Empire State Gas & Electric Association, New York Times 
(September 28, 1940), P• 21 
(2) Report of Special Committee on Public Utility Finance 
of the National Associa~ion of Railroad and Public 
Utility Commissioners, ~rooeedings of the Fifteenth 
Annual Meeting (1938), p. 411 
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'Naturally carrier executives try to 
prevent default on fixed obligations 
even if so doing may result in allow-
ing the property to deteriorate and 
service to suffer.' (1) 
"Deterioration of property and services in the railroad 
industry is a hazard no more harmful to the public interest 
than would be a similar deterioration in the utility field. 
Thus it has been demonstrated that perpetuation of too much 
debt is potentially injurious not only to the investor, who 
is apt to lose his investment, but to the consumer and the 
public as well." (2) 
No attempt will be made to answer the debt ques-
tion of public utilities. The only purpose of mentioning 
it here is to raise the question - is it not possible that 
public utilities today are in a position comparable to 
that of the railroads in about 1915 or 1920 when they 
entered upon a secular declining trend. If this is true, 
it will definitely be to the advantage of investors to 
invest in those companies which provide sinking funds in 
their bond indentures and otherwise exert a real effort 
towards debt reduction. 
(l) Bulletin issued by Securities and Exchange Commission 
on Holding Company Aet, Release No. 2535, p. 2.2 -For 
release on February 4, 1941 · 
(2) Report of Special Committee on Public Utility Finance 
of the National Association of Railroad and Public 
Utility Commissioners, Proceedings of the Fifteenth 
Annual Meeting (1938)., p. 411 
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The next section of the paper was devoted to 
an examination .of borderline railroads. We found that 
this group of carriers represented an important part of 
the American railroad system. 
We assumed that it was an economic advantage 
to the country as a whole that our railroads avoided 
bankruptcy. Basing our discussion on this assumption, 
we examined each of the railroads which, according to our 
test, proved to be a borderline railroad with the thought 
in mind that by this analysis we might arrive at a policy 
which, if employed, could be used to avoid receivership 
and bankruptcy entanglements. 
The relatively thorough discussion of the 
Boston & Maine plan represents to the author a model for 
voluntary recapitalizations. The only serious objection 
to the plan was that the RFC required cash for sinking 
fund payments, whereas the author suggested it· would be 
to the road's advantage to make the payments in bonds when 
they could be purchased in the open market at a discount. 
A criticism of this suggestion might be that the 
RFC is interested in getting as much back on its loan as 
quickly as possible. The answer to this is that the RFC 
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is an emergency credit agency designed to aid corpora-
tions which are financially sound fundamentally but 
which are embarrassed temp~rarily. By allowing the com-
pany to make sinking fund payments in bonds, they would 
facilitate the company in reducing a greater portion of 
its debt with a given amount of cash and likewise 
improving the risk of the loan remaining with the RFC. 
An essential feature of any policy for building 
up a railroad's financial structure would be the refrain-
ing from paying dividends until interest charges were 
earned at least twice for a minimum of three consecutive 
years. When a company had an exceptionally prosperous 
year and the price of their bonds reflected this so that 
there would be no substantial saving to be derived through 
debt purchases in the open market, the company sh9uld then 
use its funds to build up working capital to give it an 
opportunity to take advantage of any decline in bond prices 
for debt retirement when a depression year occurred. 
Another policy which could be adopted to a lim-
ited degree would be to borrow from the RFC for the pur-
pose of retiring debt when the price of these obligations 
made it advantageous to do so. The same retort would 
probably be made to this suggestion as to the previous one, 
-149-
only this time a good "Liberal" would add that govern-
ment agencies were not established for the purpose of 
facilitating the "playing of the stock market". 
As an example of how this policy would work, 
let us assume that a railroad had $1,000,000 of funded 
debt and the interest rate were 5 per cent. If we 
assume that the above amount were the entire fixed charge 
of the company, we would .arrive at $50,000 for total 
fixed charges. Let us also assume that fixed charges 
were only covered once. This would make:, $50,00.0 available 
for fixed charges. Since this would lend a considerable 
degree of risk to this type of obligation, it would prob-
ably be selling at a considerable discount. Let us 
assume that this would be about 50 per cent. (Many obli-
gations of this type are selling at a lower level than 
this in present day markets.) If the RFO would lend this 
company enough money to retire one-fourth of its debt 
through purchases in the open market at the same rate of 
interest, let us see what effect these transactions would 
have on the company's finances. There would be $750,000 
in funded debt remaining and a $125,000 loan to the RFC, 
making a total debt of $875,000. If we now assume the 
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same amount available for charges as before, $50,000, we 
find that fixed charges are covered 1.14 times .since 
interest charges have been reduced from $50,000 to 
$43,750. Since the RFC would probably make the loan at 
a lower interest rate than that of the bonds already out-
standing, the saving would be even greater. If the bonds 
purchased were pledged as collateral for the RFC loan, 
the RFC would have $250,000 in collateral for a loan of 
$125,000, and the finances of the company would be 
improved considerably. 
A policy of this type would necessarily have to 
be pursued over a period of time because if it became known 
that a certain company were going into the open market to 
buy a considerable amount of bonds speculators would "run 
up" the price very quickly. However, if a company were 
to pursue a policy of watchful waiting and capitalize on 
"breaks" in the markets, it is quite probable that it could 
purchase a considerable amount of bonds without increasing 
their price appreciably. 
A fundamental characteristic of second-grade or 
borderline railroad bond prices is that the nearer-term 
maturity bonds always sell at higher prices than the far-
term bonds. The reasoning behind this is that investors 
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and speculators believe that the company will probably 
be able to meet the first or second maturity but that 
this will probably deplete the company's resources to 
such an extent that they will then be extremely vulner-
able. These price discrepancies are sometimes t ·remend-
ous. For example, the Bangor & Aroostbock bonds due in 
1943 are currently selling at 90, while those due in 
1951 are selling at 51. The issue due in 1943 comprises 
about J~ million, while those due in 1951 amount to over 
12 million. 
When a situation such as this exists, I believe 
the RFO should encourage the company to reduce that por-
tion of its debt which is selling at the greatest dis-
count. The bonds retired could be used as collateral for 
a loan to meet the near-term maturity bonds ' when they 
became due. Usually, however, a company will direct its 
efforts towards reducing the nearest term maturity with 
utter disregard for the discounts available on the longer 
term issues. 
The two policies discussed above could be adopt-
ed to a great extent as permanent policies. If we now add 
to these the necessary essential policy of avoiding 
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dividend action until fixed charges are covered at least 
twice, working capital becomes ample, revenues amount to 
at least $. 75 to $1.00 per dollar of debt and, of course, 
we must assume that the physical property will be ade-
quately maintained, the railroad Will be on the road to 
permanent financial stability. 
If, however, a railroad is faced with excessive 
maturities and funds cannot be borrowed for these pur-
poses, it is greatly to the advantage of both the investor 
and the company to avoid receivership. 
In general,_. the essential elements of the Boston 
& Maine plan should be employed. The plan could be 
carried out as follows: 
First, determine the amount of fixed interest 
bonds that the company can easily service and establish 
it as the new fixed interest debt. Let the RFC buy a good 
portion of these bonds so that some cash can be given to 
the holders of bonds who desire some cash instead of all 
new bonds. The remainder of these bonds should then be 
distributed pro rata among the public bondholders. Income 
bonds should then constitute the remainder of the fixed 
debt, but a sinking fund for fixed interest bond retire-
ment should be provided for before the income available 
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for interest on the income bonds. 
A capital fund should also be set up where the 
physical condition of the railroad shows need of better-
ment. 
A sinking fund for income bond retirement should 
also be provided so that over a period of time the fixed 
debt would be reduced. The interest on the income obliga-
tions should be made cumulative so that in the long run 
the bondholder will not have lost his income to the stock-
holders in case the earnings of the company are erratic 
and income interest is not earned in some years. 
* * * 
The reader should not construe these policies to 
be a cure-all for the many railroad financial problems, 
and they are not designed to counteract a shrinkage of rev-
enue of 50 to 75 per cent. The above-mentioned policies 
present in simple form means and methods by which railroad 
management can materially improve their financial struc-
ture, other things being relatively equal. They are 
designed to give railroads a greater degree of stability 
than they now possess. 
-154-
The policy of borrowing from the RFC would be 
attacked by many as merely a "borrowing from Peter to pay 
Paul". It cannot be denied, however, that it would, if 
employed, materially improve the status of many of our 
borderline companies -over a period of time. 
* * * 
The outline presented for voluntary recapitali-
zation of embarrassed railroads is not designed to rees-
tablish a company which is on the verge of bankruptcy to 
a grade "A" credit risk by a mere"presto-ohango" exchange 
of security obligations. It does, however, present a 
simple plan by which a railroad can avoid bankruptcy with 
t ·he consequent legal entanglements with which we are so 
familiar. It also provides a means whereby the bond-
holder will continue to receive some income on his invest-
ment instead of it being terminated completely as would 
be the case if the railroad were to file a petition in 
bankruptcy. 
* * * 
The present defense program with its stimulation 
to the heavy goods industry has already placed gross rev-
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enues of the average Class I railroad on a level compar-
able to 1930. With this sudden impetus to the railroad 
industr~profits before taxes for the year 1941 should in 
general approximate those of 1930. 
The author predicts at least a 50 per cent 
increase in the price of the common stock of the average 
railroad within the next year if the railroad normally 
derives 25 per cent or more of its revenues from the haul-
ing of coal, iron and steel, or similar products. Since 
bondholders have a prior lien on earnings before income 
taxes are levied, it is safe to predict that second grade 
bond prices will also rise substantially from their our-
rent depressed levels. 
* * * 
The above discussion reveals that the way to 
railroad financial rehabilitation is relatively simple 
but not easy. It will require strong-willed management 
which will fight those interests seeking dividends when-
ever the company shows a net profit. It will require that 
management recognize debt as something to be retired and 
not regard it as a perpetuity. Given this attitude on the 
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part of management and the continued present degree of 
railroad prosperity, the railroads can reasonably return 
to the favor with whioh the investing public once 
regarded them. 
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